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Racial Identity, Electoral Structures,

and the First Amendment Right of
Association
Guy-Uriel E. Charles

This Article develops a novel and provocative approachfor thinking
about the role of race in democratic politics. Professor Charles identifies
the Supreme Court's descriptive and normative struggles with racialidentity, which have led many on the Court to question the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act. He relies upon the social identity literaturein social
psychology, as well as the race andpolitics literature in political science,
to demonstrate empirically the relationship between racial and political
identity. He then uses the right of association,particularlyas developed by
the Supreme Court in the party and ballot access cases, to argue that the
FirstAmendment protects the right of voters of color to associate as voters
of color where race and political identity are correlated In so doing, he
characterizes the Court's attempt to grasp the proper role of race in
democraticpolitics as a deeper struggle between equality and liberty values. He concludes by suggesting a framework for balancing liberty and
equality concerns in the design of electoral institutions.
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence suffers from an
identity crisis. The Court's cases support at least two divergent propositions. In some cases, the Court has intimated that state actors violate the
Equal Protection Clause if they justify race consciousness in the design of
democratic structures on the assumption that racial identity' and political
identity2 are positively correlated.' Indeed, at times the Court speaks as if
I. "Racial identification" is defined as a self-awareness that one belongs to a particular racial
group (or groups) and a psychological sense of attachment to that racial group. See PATRICIA GURIN ET
AL., HOPE & INDEPENDENCE: BLACKS' RESPONSE TO ELECTORAL AND PARTY POLITICS 75 (1989);
Pamela Johnston Conover, The Role of Social Groups in PoliticalThinking, 18 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 51, 52
(1988).
2.

In this Article, "political identification" is primarily defined as party identification, as well as

political ideology or orientation such as self-location on a liberal-conservative continuum. See
KATHERINE TATE, FROM PROTEST TO POLITICS: THE NEW BLACK VOTERS IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS

64(1993).
3.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Shaw 1) (stating that race-based districting
"bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid"); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985
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the Fourteenth Amendment demands the eradication of racial identity as a
subset of political identity,4 although it has not explicitly mandated race
blindness in the composition of electoral structures.5 In other cases, however, the Court has maintained that the Fourteenth Amendment is capable
of accommodating state action that recognizes race as a basis for political
identity.6 These cases imply that state actors may assume a relationship
between racial and political identity and may accordingly take race into
account in the design of democratic institutions.7 These incongruous positions lead to the conclusion that, at best, the Court is genuinely vexed and
perplexed by the relationship between racial and political identity.
The mixed message communicated by the Court's voting rights cases
is understandable because of the multiple and often crosscutting constitutional values at play in these cases.' However, the Court has failed to provide any guidance for resolving the uneasy tension of these coexisting
constitutional values. While both the Court and commentators have recognized that race consciousness in the design of democratic structures
touches upon Fourteenth Amendment equality considerations, 9 they have
(1996) (noting that voters are "more than mere racial statistics" and that the Court's "Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive use and
reinforcement of racial stereotypes"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (remarking that the
assumption that voters of color "share a single political interest" is "the precise use of race as a proxy
the Constitution prohibits"); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial
Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie As a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
227 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE
L.J. 2505 (1997). As used in this Article, the terms "electoral structures." "democratic structures," and
"democratic institutions" refer to methods of conducting elections or, more precisely, voting systems.
These methods include districting (single member or multiple member), cumulative voting, preference
voting, proportional representation, and other types of voting structures. For typologies and definitions
of electoral structures, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1089-1131 (2002).
4.
See, e.g., Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 (categorizing as an "impermissible stereotype" any
purported relationship between racial and political identity).
5. Id. at 642 ("This Court never has held that race-conscious state decision-making is
impermissible in all circumstances.").
6.
See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (Cromartie 11);
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52 (1964); Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small Treatise Accompanied
by Districting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 137, 216-17
(2002) ("As a practical matter, Cromartie II modifies Vera's holding that race cannot be used as a
proxy to accomplish other objectives. The distinction between the impermissible use of race in Vera
and the permissible use in Cromartie 11appears thin.").
7.
See, e.g., Cromartie I1,532 U.S. at 241-42; Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); United
Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977).
8.
Although other factors may explain the state of the Court's racial districting cases-see, for
example, Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644, 716 (1998) (noting that judicial involvement in
democratic politics has not often been accompanied or animated by a constitutional theory of
democratic politics)-this Article argues that one of the Court's primary problems in the racial
districting cases is coming to terms with the proper role of race in democratic politics.
9.
For example, Justice O'Connor stated in Shaw I that "[cilassifications of citizens solely on
the basis of race 'are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
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ignored important and sometimes countervailing liberty interests under the

First Amendment.' Hence, the Court's voting 'ights jurisprudence and the
scholarly literature have focused on the Equal Protection Clause and its
equality concerns, to the exclusion of the First Amendment and its
attendant liberty concerns. "
the doctrine of equality."' Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 643 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943)). She also noted that "[1]aws that... distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall
within the core" of the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition "that '[n]o state ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' Id. at 642 (quoting U.S. CONST., amend. XIV,
§ ).
10. Notable exceptions include James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The
Redistricting Cases as Badges of Slavery, 39 How. L.J. 633, 687 (1996); Terry Smith, A Black Party?
Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 56 & n.243
(1998). The tension between First Amendment values and equal protection values has gone unnoticed
in the context of voting rights, but it exists in other contexts as well. Commentators have observed this
tension in several domains. Affirmative Action: See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 1839, 1846 (1996) ("The prevailing equal protection paradigm has long since dissipated any
useful intellectual energy directed toward solving the conundrum of affirmative action. Rather, the
proper solution lies in reexamining official raceconsciousness through the lens of speech."). School
Desegregation: See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1959) ("[T]he question posed by state-enforced segregation is not one of discrimination at
all. Its human and its constitutional dimensions lie entirely elsewhere, in the denial by the state of
freedom to associate, a denial that impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be
involved."). But see Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
412, 428-29 (1960); Derrick A. Bell Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522 (1980) ("To doubt that racial segregation is harmful
to blacks, and to suggest that what blacks really sought was the right to associate with whites, is to
believe in a world that does not exist now and could not possibly have existed then."). Hate Speech: See
Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267
(1991); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J.
484. But see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Charles R. Lawrence llI, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). Sexual
Orientation: See Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-DiscriminationLaw After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public
Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591 (2001); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech,
and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993).
11.
To be sure, the relevant literature is quite insightful on other aspects of the Court's doctrine.
Some scholars have focused on the coherence, or lack thereof, of the Court's racial gerrymandering
doctrine. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000); Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment,
Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political Gerrymanderingand the Supreme Court, 43
EMORY L.J. 1519 (1994). Other scholars have directed their criticism at the widespread perception that
the Court has not identified a constitutional harm sufficient to justify the constitutionalization of raceconscious districting. See Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 23; A. Leon Higginbotham et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions with
Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593 (1994); Melissa L. Saunders,
Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting, 109 YALE L.J. 1603 (2000). Still
others have debated the rationality of the Court's decision to grant standing to indistricted plaintiffs.
See Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Identifying the Harm in Racial Gerrymandering
Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is
Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1996); Judith Reed, Sense and Nonsense: Standing in the Racial
Districting Cases as a Window on the Supreme Court's View of the Right to Vote, 4 MICH. J. RACE &
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1213 2003
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Of equal importance, the Court's failure to appreciate the several constitutional values at issue in the voting rights cases has hampered its ability
to think more broadly about the structure and content of democratic politics.' 2 In particular, the Court's voting rights jurisprudence fails to specify
whether the types of political rights at issue in the racial gerrymandering
cases present a "race" problem and are therefore subject to its traditional
equal protection jurisprudence or whether they are an "analytically
distinct" something else. 3 . Consequently, the attempt to filter most questions of democratic politics solely through the two words "equal
protection" is limiting, limitless, and ultimately unproductive. 4
L. 389, 456 (1999); Bradley David Wine, Can You Get to Kings County from Interstate 85? A
Reevaluation of United Jewish Organizations v. Carey in Light of Shaw v. Reno, 19 VT. L. REV. 843
(1995). "Indistricted" is a term Issacharoff and Goldstein coined to distinguish individuals who have
standing to assert a Shaw claim because officials took race into account in the design of their districts
from those whose district lines were indirectly affected by the decision to create a race-conscious
district elsewhere. Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra. Finally, many scholars have decried the Court's
individualist conception of the right to vote. See Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority
Political Participationand Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449 (1988); Vikram
David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of PoliticalRights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915 (1998);
Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001);
Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1716 (1999); Reed, supra; James
Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and [Mis]representation, Part II: Deconstructing the
ObstructionistVision of the Right to Vote, 43 How. L.J. 405, 456 (2000).
12. Professor Amar makes a similar observation in an analogous context. See Akhil Reed Amar,
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992).
Commenting on the Justices' failure to read the Constitution holistically in deciding on the
constitutionality of an ordinance preventing cross burning, he stated:
All nine Justices analyzed cross burning and other forms of racial hate speech by focusing
almost exclusively on the First Amendment. They all seemed to have forgotten that it is a
Constitution they are expounding, and that the Constitution contains not just the First
Amendment, but the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well.
Id. at 125.
The Court is not the only institution to have ignored the relationship between the First and
Fourteenth Amendments in the design of democratic structures. As Professor Chen has observed,
"election law specialists typically analyze [election law problems] ... in complete isolation from other
legal means for enhancing communicative or political diversity." Chen, supranote 10, at 1870.
13. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 3, at 284 ("This lack of clarity is due in part to the
fact that the Court as an institution is agnostic with respect to whether these cases are about race or
whether they are about politics.").
14.

See

ROBERT

B.

McKAY,

REAPPORTIONMENT: THE

LAW

AND

POLITICS

OF

EQUAL

215 (1965):
The equal protection of the laws clause of the fourteenth amendment is not self-defining; it
does not even speak with a single voice. Rather it provides a vessel into which can be poured
interpretations of the command for equality appropriate to the varied contexts in which the
concept of equality may apply.
Id.; Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS & SOCIETY 110, 111 (P. Laslett
& W. Runciman eds., 1962); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).
Consider also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that recount ordered by Florida
Supreme Court violated the Equal Protection Clause), in this context. By most accounts, Bush v. Gore
represents a novel and potentially expansive application of the Equal Protection Clause. The per curiam
recognized the possible implications of its ruling and attempted to contain the potentially limitless
applications of equal protection to the various inequalities in the election process by proclaiming that
"[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
REPRESENTATION
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In this Article I explore dimensions of the role of race in democratic
politics that the Court has ignored by focusing on equal protection interests. In particular, I suggest the First Amendment as an alternative constitutional basis for thinking about the relationship between race and
democratic politics in constitutional law. 5 I argue that voters of color have
a First Amendment interest in associating politically when their racial identity overlaps with their political identity. 6 As a consequence of this right of
political association, taking race into account in, tke composition of democratic structures constitutes a compelling state interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Accordingly, where racial identity is associated with political
identity, the Supreme Court should permit state actors to take race into
account in the design of democratic institutions. 7
Part I surveys the Court's racial districting cases and argues that the
Court's racial districting jurisprudence can best be understood by making
explicit the Court's presuppositions about racial identity. Part II draws
upon the social identity literature in social psychology to argue that the
Court's assumptions about racial identity are inconsistent with what we
know about social and racial identity formation. This Part also relies upon
the race and politics literature in political science and draws upon the political experiences of African Americans to demonstrate empirically the
role race plays in American politics. Part III explores the Court's political
association cases and contends that they are relevant to the question of race
election processes generally presents many complexities." Id. at 109. Note also that the per curiam did
not purport to take issue with the many inequalities involved in the administration of elections. Rather,
it attempted to cabin the issue to "a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity
has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards." Id. In these situations "there
must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and fundamental
fairness are satisfied." Id. The Court attempted to contain the potentially limitless reach of a formalistic
equal protection analysis by drawing an arbitrary line that is ultimately unproductive to understanding
inequality in the political process.
15. To be clear, I do not argue that simply switching constitutional provisions would
automatically change the outcome in the redistricting case. My argument on this score is two-fold.
First, the claims presented in the Shaw line of cases are associational claims. However, these cases do
not fit very well as equal protection claims. Second, the Court has thought more deeply about
associational rights in the First Amendment context. The First Amendment right of association provides
us with a more useful and robust framework for thinking about the relationship among race,
association, and political rights.
16. One methodological note: Although this Article is particularly concerned with the First
Amendment implications of the Court's voting rights cases on the associational rights of voters of
color, the arguments advanced need not be limited to voters of color. They are applicable to any group,
racial or otherwise, whose social identity is politically salient. In addition to an independent concern
with the political rights of voters of color, the perspective of voters of color is a useful heuristic for
exploring these important and interesting constitutional questions. Thus, the arguments propounded in
this Article apply whenever a relevant social characteristic is correlative with political identity. See
infra text accompanying notes 423-26.
17.
It is important to clarify here what I am not arguing. I am not claiming that voters of color
have fights to a majority-minority district or a district of their own. Rather, I am arguing that the First
Amendment entitles racial groups to participate meaningfully in the political process as racial groups,
where race is politically salient.
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1215 2003
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and representation. This Part also argues that the political association cases
are applicable to the design of electoral structures and demonstrates how
the design of electoral structures might unconstitutionally burden the
individual's right of political association. Part III concludes that voters of
color have a right of political association when race and political identity
are correlated and have an attendant claim against the state when the design
of electoral structures would unduly and negatively affect their ability to
aggregate their political power. Part IV argues that the equality interest is
not so sufficiently compelling that it should automatically trump the
individual's liberty right. Part V addresses the implications of the
arguments advanced in this Article. In particular, Part V discusses the
limits of the associational right and presents some guidance for resolving
the tension between liberty and equality in the racial districting cases. This
Part also explains how districting often impedes the individual's ability to
associate with like-minded others, thereby frustrating the individual's First
Amendment right. Although this Article argues that race is a proper basis
for state action in democratic politics, it specifies when and how race
should matter in adjudicating political rights. The Article concludes by
proposing that where the political and racial identities of a racial group
intersect-that is, where racial and political identification are positively
correlated-race is a proper consideration of state action in electoral politics.
I
UNDERLYING PREMISES OF RACIAL DISTRICTING CASES

The Court's modem voting rights revolution began with Shaw v. Reno
(Shaw 1). 18In Shaw I, the Court held that a plaintiff could maintain a cause
of action under the Equal Protection Clause when a state engages in racial
gerrymandering-that is, when it intentionally includes or excludes voters
within legislative districts on the basis of racial considerations. More specifically, the Court concluded that "redistricting legislation that is so
extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an
effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting" is justiciable under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Although the Court has yet to settle upon a single theory that explains why race-conscious redistricting violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's subsequent voting rights cases have
not retreated from Shaw rs conclusion that race-conscious redistricting
implicates equality concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment.2"

18. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
19.
Id. at 642,658.
20. For a thorough exposition, see Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 3, at 235-53; Rubin,
supra note 1I.
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1216 2003
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Understanding the Court's reactions to race-influenced electoral structures and racial identity requires interpreting admittedly cryptic and meager
clues. Nevertheless, the Court's doctrine provides some illuminating guidelines once unpacked. Using the Court's equal protection and voting rights
jurisprudence, this Part sorts through the Court's enigmatic pronouncements on racial identity and reveals four premises that underlie the Court's
decisions. First, the Court is skeptical that racial identity exists. Second, the
Court is concerned that state action on the basis of racial identity is
essentialist. Third, when the Court is willing to assume that racial identity
is a significant feature of the social landscape, with political implications, it
then also concludes that racial identity is a political construction imposed
by political elites who are cynically manipulating the electorate. Fourth,
the Court's reaction to racial identity presupposes that the Court, under the
aegis of judicial review, can minimize the effect of racial identity on the
political landscape.
A.

Skepticism About the Existence of RacialIdentity

What is it about the intentional aggregation of voters of color into voting districts that the Court finds constitutionally objectionable and "so
irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial
equality"?2 The Court's negative reaction to state action on the basis of
racial identity is based in part upon a deep skepticism that racial identity in
fact exists. 2 That is, as a matter of empirical fact, the Court is unconvinced
that individuals define themselves on the basis of their race and that this
self-definition has real political and social implications.23 Thus, in Shaw I,
the Court maintained:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals
who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely
separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may
21. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 652. The Court also asserted:
Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by
alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so
irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into
separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient
justification.
Id. at 658.
22. See generally Karlan & Levinson, supra note 11, at 1216-17 (discussing how Shaw and
Miller evidence the Court's misunderstanding of the relationship between race and politics); john a.
powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789,
790-91 (1997) (identifying and criticizing this skepticism).
23.
Voting rights is not the only area in which the Court has expressed skepticism about racial
identity claims. At least one scholar has recognized a similar phenomenon in the Court's school
desegregation jurisprudence. See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v.
Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (1993)
("[Tlhe courts are embracing a social reality that does not exist: a society in which race is viewed as an
irrelevant characteristic.").
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have little in common with one another but the color of their skin,
bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It
reinforces the perception that members of the same racial groupregardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which they live-think alike, share the same
political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.
We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible
racial stereotypes.24
Similarly, in Miller v. Johnson, the Court stated:
It is true that redistricting in most cases will implicate a political
calculus in which various interests compete for recognition, but it
does not follow from this that individuals of the same race share a
single political interest. The view that they do is based on the
demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups
ascribe to certain "minority views" that must be different from
those of other citizens, the precise use of race as proxy the
Constitution prohibits."
The Court's characterization of racial identity arguments in the voting
rights cases further illustrates its skepticism. The Court portrays these
arguments not only as based upon a claim that "members of the same racial
and ethnic groups ... think alike, ' 26 but also as reflecting impermissible
"assumptions, ' 27 "notion[s], ' 28 "perceptions," 29 or "stereotypes." 3 The
Court implies that the claim of racial identity does not have any basis in
fact and need not be taken seriously.

24. Shaw 1,509 U.S. at 647.
25.
515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (internal citations omitted). These sentiments are reflected in the
Court's subsequent voting rights cases. For example, in Vera the Court stated:
Legislators and district courts nationwide have modified their practices-or, rather,
reembraced the traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before
the 1990 census-in response to Shaw 1.Those practices and our precedents, which
acknowledge voters as more than mere racial statistics, play an important role in defining the
political identity of the American voter. Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a
commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and reinforcement of
racial stereotypes.
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996). See also Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (objecting to the "demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups
ascribe to certain 'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens").
26. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Shaw 1, 509
U.S. at 647-48.
27. Miller, 515 U.S. at 914; Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 678; Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 571 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
28. Miller, 515 U.S. at 914 (quoting Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting));
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1027 (1994); Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 648.
29. Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 647.
30. "But where the State assumes from a group of voters' race that they 'think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls,' it engages in racial
stereotyping at odds with equal protection mandates." Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (quoting Shaw 1, 509
U.S. at 647); see also id at 912, 914, 928.
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Justice Thomas's forceful and eloquent concurrence in Holder v. Hall
succinctly captures this skepticism.' There, Justice Thomas maintained

that the constitutionality of majority-minority districts3 2 rests upon a
"working assumption that racial groups can be conceived of largely as
political interest groups."33 Challenging this working assumption on descriptive grounds, Justice Thomas concluded that there is no evidence that
"race itself determines a distinctive political community of interest."34
Thus, majority-minority districts, or, as Justice Thomas described it, "our

drive to segregate political districts by race," necessarily rests upon an
implicit assumption "that members of racial and ethnic groups... all think
alike."35 For Justice Thomas and the Court, this assumption is incorrect as
an empirical matter. 6
B.

Individualism and Opposition to Race Essentialism

As a consequence of its skeptical reaction to racial identity claims, the

Court and opponents of race-conscious districting frequently have concluded that race-conscious districting is inconsistent with the
Constitution's equality norm. This norm, we are told, demands that
"[g]overnment ... treat citizens 'as individuals, not as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."' 3 7 Along similar lines,
members of the Court are fond of quoting Justice Douglas in Wright v.
Rockefeller: it is the "individual [who] is important, not his race, his creed,
or his color."38 On this view, a fundamental problem with a reapportionment process that accounts for race is the failure of state actors to treat
individuals as individuals.
The Court has characterized the repair to an individualistic understanding of voting and representation as the "antiessentialism factor" in the
voting rights cases.39 "Essentialism" is the "attribution of political or
31.
512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
32. A majority-minority district is a district in which the majority of voters are citizens of color.
33. Holder, 512 U.S. at 905 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 904.
35. Id. at 903,907.
36. Id. at 903-08. The assumption is also unpalatable to the Court as a normative matter. Justice
Thomas explains that even if we discovered evidence of political identification on the basis of race,
allocating political power on that basis "should be repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a
color-blind Constitution." Id. at 905-06.
37.
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (internal quotations omitted).
38.
376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964). Justice Douglas went on to note that the "principle of equality is at
war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District
B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on." Id.
See, e.g., Holder, 512 U.S. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Justice Douglas in Wright); Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) (Shaw 1) (same); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 89 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (same).
39. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
ConstitutionalLines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 615-18 (1993).
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cultural views to persons based simply on their race[, which] denies
persons recognition and treatment based upon their individual
characteristics." 4 The antiessentialism principle attempts to limit the
state's ability to ascribe a political identity to an individual on the basis of
the individual's group identity.
There are at least two ways to make sense of the Court's concern with
essentialism in the voting rights cases. On the one hand, the Court may be
expressing a strong affinity for individualized determinations. In that case,
the state must determine each voter's political interests and political identity in an individualized manner. On the other hand, the Court may be
expressing a concern with "value reductionism," the process by which one
legitimate value comes to dominate all others.4' In that case, the state
reduces the individual's identity to "one unalterable characteristic."42
Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke nicely illustrates both aspects of the Court's concern with individualism. According to Justice Powell, the constitutional defect inherent in
the admissions program at the University of California at Davis was its
failure to treat each applicant as an individual.44 He wrote that the "denial
to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to
his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program."45
He described individualized determination as the need to apply the same
criteria to each applicant. A lack of individualized determination distinguished the constitutionally infirm admissions program at Davis from the
Harvard and Princeton programs.
Consider now a second aspect of the Court's concern with essentialism: state-imposed limitations on the individual's ability to self-define. As
Professor Martha Minow has observed, "[g]ovemmental-and personalpreoccupation with group identity works to hide each person's uniqueness,
membership in multiple groups, and subjection by the incoherencies of
' Justice Powell's
group-based notions."46
opinion in Bakke also reflects this
concern. As Justice Powell stated with respect to the Harvard admissions
program:
40. Id. at 615. See also Gerken, supra note 11,at 1718-19. The concern with essentialism, though
problematic, makes sense within the equal protection context. See Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the
Expression-Equality Conundrum: Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1688
(2000).
41.
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 500
(1993).
42. Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 903 & n. 124 (1995).
43. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
44. Id. at 318 & n.52.
45. Id. at n.52.
46. Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 673
(1996).
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The file of a particular black applicant may be examined for his
potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being
decisive when compared, for example, with that of an applicant
identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.
Such qualities could include exceptional personal talents, unique
work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage,
ability to communicate with the poor, or other qualifications
deemed important. In short, an admissions program operated in this
way is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of'
diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant,
and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although
not necessarily according them the same weight.47
Put differently, Justice Powell objected to the state precluding individuals from opting in and opting out of the applicable evaluative criteria
and thus circumscribing their right to self-define.48 He found the state's
assumption in Bakke-that white applicants could not contribute to the
educational diversity of the medical school-normatively and empirically
unacceptable. Justice Powell also objected to the state's assumption that all
applicants of color would contribute to the educational diversity of the
school. In other words, for Justice Powell, state action on the basis of race
diminishes a complex and multifaceted existence to a single characteristic
(race) and (arbitrarily) defines individuals on that basis.49
The first aspect of antiessentialism-a concern with individualized
decision making-translates very poorly to the voting rights context.
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
48. Justice Powell maintained:
[T]he Davis special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial classification
never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or
Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering
class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including
their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats.
At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in
the class.
The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 319-20.
49. Minow, supra note 46, at 653. Professors Pildes and Niemi refer to this process in an
analogous context as "value reductionism." Pildes & Niemi, supra note 41, at 500. For Professors
Pildes and Niemi:
When race becomes the single dominant value to which the process subordinates all others,
however, it triggers Shaw. For the Court, what distinguishes "bizarre" race-conscious districts
is the signal they send out that, to government officials, race has become paramount and
dwarfed all other, traditionally relevant criteria. This view is the foundation of the qualitative
distinction central to Shaw: at a certain point, the use of race can amount to value
reductionism that creates the social impression that one legitimate value has come to
dominate all others.
Id. at 501.
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Individualized determination does not fit with the current system of aggregating voters and is not a realistic option." The question is not whether, but
rather by which characteristics, to aggregate voters. 5'
The second aspect of antiessentialism-protecting the individual's
right to self-define-is sensible in the voting rights context. The voting
rights cases are clearly concerned with the state's power to define the individual in a manner inconsistent with the individual's own self-definition. 2
The Court is also concerned with the use of race as the sole or determinative definitional criterion. 53 The Court stated in Miller v. Johnson that
"[r]ace-based assignments 'embody stereotypes that treat individuals as the
product of their race, evaluating their thoughts and efforts-their very
worth as citizens-according to a criterion barred to the Government by
history and the Constitution."' 54 The Court went on to note that these are
the very stereotypical assumptions the Equal Protection Clause forbids. 5
Thus, for the Court, political identity cannot be assumed from racial identity. In other words, voters who share racial identity do not necessarily
share political interests. 5 6 To assume a correlation is to engage in a form of
impermissible essentialism.
Importantly, the constitutional objection to race-conscious districting
is not only that the state defines the individual on the basis of an arbitrary
characteristic but also that the state chooses the characteristic. 57 Hence,
state action here is essentialist both because the state chooses to elevate one
arguably irrelevant characteristic above all others and because the state
does the choosing.58 The proposition that voters should be treated as
50. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 1I,at 1204.
51. Id.
52. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Shaw I); Gerken, supranote 11,at 1727-28.
53.
Professor Katz argued that the Court appeared to have engaged in a similar analysis in Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 945 (2000). See Ellen Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99
MICH. L. REV. 491, 495 (2000) (noting that Rice asserts that race-based electorate definitions defeat the
primary benefits of political participation).
54. 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1995)
(O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
55. ld.at914.
56. Id. ("The view that they do [have the same interests] is 'based on the demeaning notion that
members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain "minority views" that must be different from

those of other citizens,' the precise use of race as a proxy the Constitution prohibits." Id. (quoting
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted)).
57. See Issacharoff, supra note 42, at 903 (stating that "the act of assigning representation on the
basis of what state authorities determine to be the defining feature of a citizen's existence is necessarily
problematic"); see also IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE

(1996); Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determinationof "Race" in Race-Conscious
Law, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1231 (1994).

58.

Aleinikoff and Issacharoff note that "[t]he official line drawers roam around the state

identifying members of protected groups in an effort to gather up enough voters of the appropriate race
to form an electoral majority." Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 39, at 615; see also Karlan &
Levinson, supra note 11, at 1217 (stating that "race operates primarily as an external ascription of a
particular identity to the minority group by the majority").
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individuals need not only involve separate and individualized determination of each voter's interests and identities. The proposition can also be
concerned with the individual's right to self-define and to have the state
categorize him or her by a characteristic the individual finds salient. This
state categorization is precisely the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint in
Shaw I and its progeny. The state chose to define them and it chose to do
so on the basis of an arbitrary characteristic (race) that the plaintiffs did not
find politically salient.59
The Role of PoliticalElites in Constructing RacialIdentity
If the Court is suspicious of the claim that political behavior is in part
a function of racial identity and if the Court is concerned that state action
on the basis of racial identity is essentialist, how does it explain the political reality of race-conscious districting, or, in Justice Thomas's formulation, "our drive to segregate political districts by race"?6" For the most part,
the Court has left this question unanswered. On the rare occasions when it
has been willing to acknowledge the existence and political consequence of
racial identity, the Court has often explained it away as a construction of
political elites. That is, the Court sees political elites as sardonically
manipulating the electoral lines and engendering an artificial difference
that is exogenous to the political process by aggregating individuals on the
basis of an arbitrary characteristic. 6'
Miller v. Johnson62 provides an apt example of the Court's understanding of the role that political elites play in shaping racial and political
identity. 3 The central question in Miller was whether the state of Georgia
articulated a sufficiently compelling interest for its admitted intent to create
a majority-black district, the Eleventh District.64 The state justified the
C.

59. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (Shaw 1); see also Karlan & Levinson, supra
note 11, at 1214 ("The plaintiffs in the wrongful districting cases were not really protesting their
exclusion from anything. Rather, they were protesting the inclusion of too many nonwhite voters in the
district to which they were assigned.").
60. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also CAROL M.
SWAIN,

BLACK

FACES,

BLACK

INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION

OF

AFRICAN

AMERICANS

IN

CONGRESS 47-73 (1995).
Professors Aleinikoff and Issacharoff describe this process perfectly:
61.
In a democratic society, the purpose of voting is to allow the electors to select their
governors. Once a decade, however, that process is inverted, and the governors and their
political agents are permitted to select their electors. Through the process of redistricting,
incumbent office holders and their political agents choose what configuration of voters best
suits their political agenda. The decennial redistricting battles reveal the bloodsport of
politics, shorn of the claims of ideology, social purpose, or broad policy goals. Redistricting
is politics pure, fraught with the capacity for self-dealing and cynical manipulation.
Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 39, at 588.
62. 515 U.S. 900, 920-27 (1995).
63.
Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1998).
64. 515 U.S. at 920-27.
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intentional creation of three majority-black districts, in particular the
Eleventh District, by citing a need to comply with Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA).65 The Court rejected this justification on the grounds
that Section 5 did not require enacting the Eleventh District.66 Relying
upon its earlier delineation of the requirements of Section 5 in Beer v.
United States,67 the Court maintained that a state violates Section 5 when it
enacts a retrogressive plan that decreases the electoral prospects of voters
of color68 but not when an ameliorative plan increases the electoral prospects of voters of color by increasing the number of majority-minority districts.69 The Court remarked that the plan first submitted by the state to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) increased the number of majority-black districts from one to two.7" Consequently, the Court held that the plan could
not have violated Section 5 of the VRA.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court said that the redistricting plan
was necessary to obtain the approval of the DOJ, even though the Act did
not require it. More specifically, the Court noted that the DOJ refused to
preclear the state's second plan because the DOJ wanted the state to adopt
the American Civil Liberty Union's (ACLU's) "max-black" plan, which
contained three majority-black districts.71 The Court concluded that
"[t]here is little doubt that the State's true interest in designing the
Eleventh District was creating a third majority-black district to satisfy the
Justice Department's preclearance demands."7
However, this conclusion is not wholly accurate. As Professor
Laughlin McDonald has argued, Georgia could have defended the Eleventh
District on a number of grounds-eradicating the effects of past discrimination, avoiding vote dilution, avoiding litigation, and complying with the
civil rights laws-yet it failed to do so.73
65.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p (1994). Section 5 of the VRA requires that certain jurisdictions, states
and localities, must first preclear changes in voting procedure before those changes are implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 1973c; see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 138 (1976). Those jurisdictions that
are covered by Section 5 can either obtain prior approval from the DOJ or seek a declaratory judgment
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
66. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.
67. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
68. Id.
at141.
69. Miller, 515 U.S. at 923.
70. Id. at 906, 921-27. Although the Court did not explicitly discuss Section 2 of the VRA in
Miller, it did intimate that Section 2 could not have barred preclearance. See id. at 906 (recognizing the
"absence of any evidence of an intent to discriminate against minority voters" from the state's first
plan).
71.
Id.
at 907.
72.
Id.at 921; see also id. at 907 ("Twice spumed, the General Assembly set out to create three
majority-minority districts to gain preclearance.").
73.
Laughlin McDonald, Can Minority Voting Rights Survive Miller v. Johnson?, 1 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 119, 129-31 (1996). McDonald speculated that the state's reason for failing to argue that it
had a compelling interest in eradicating the present effects of past discrimination, and that it had a
compelling interest in complying with the civil rights laws (specifically Section 2 of the VRA), was
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The ultimate configuration of the Eleventh District was undeniably
influenced by the existence of alternative redistricting plans, such
as the Black Caucus/ACLU and Senate plans, and by the section 5
objections of the Attorney General. But just as undeniably, the
Eleventh District was conceived and first enacted as a majorityBlack district by the Georgia legislature itself, prior to any direct
intervention by the Attorney General.74
As a consequence of Georgia's "half-hearted defense of its
congressional districting plan in Miller,"" the Supreme Court was left to
speculate on the state's motives. The Court supplied a rationale for the
state's action-that the DOJ insisted upon pursuing a policy of maximizing
majority-black districts-rather than finding that the state had drawn majority-minority districts for racial and political identity reasons or for vote
dilution or remedial reasons.76 The Court struck down Georgia's redistricting plan and concluded that the nation's goals of "getting beyond race" are
not advanced by "carving electorates into racial blocs."77
The Court's approach in Miller (duplicated in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw
1/))78 reflects a top-down understanding of racial identity claims.79 For the
Court, identity is not an endogenous social characteristic that rises from the
bottom up, but instead is imposed externally from the top by political elites
in furtherance of their own ends. 8° As Professors Karlan and Levinson have
noted, the Court's traditional equal protection doctrine frames its understanding of racial identity.8' There, the majority and political elites use race

that it was part of its litigation strategy. Id. at 131; see also id. at 130 ("The State was involved in other
voting rights litigation and did not want to make admissions in Miller that might damage its position in
the other cases.").
74. Id.at 158.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921, 924-27.
77. Id.at 927. Miller is not the only case in which the DOJ came under attack from the Supreme
Court. The Court similarly excoriated the DOJ's preclearance posture in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,
913 (1996) (Shaw II) ("It appears that the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same
policy of maximizing the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia."). For an
explanation of how the Court's reaction to overreaching by the DOJ affects the Court's interpretation of
Section 5, see Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance,and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL. L. REV.
1179 (2001).
78. SeeShawll, 517U.S. at913.
79. Of course, the Court's conception of "the state" also affects its reactions to racial identity
claims. Although the Court in the racial districting cases does not come to terms with how its
conception of "the state" affects its analysis of political rights claims, it has done so on at least one
other occasion. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224 (1986) (discussing the
state as a self-interested political party seeking to preserve majority power). For a discussion of how
conceptions of state action should affect regulation of politics, see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 8, at
653-68, and Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major PoliticalParties: A Skeptical
Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1754-56 (1993).
80. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 11, at 1218.
81.
Id.at 1217.
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as a basis for discriminatory treatment, a badge of inferiority.82 Viewed in
this light, one can also understand the inflammatory language the Court
first employed in Shaw ,83 and for which it has been roundly criticized.84 In
Shaw 1, the Court compared North Carolina's District 12 to political apartheid85 ; argued that the purpose of the district was to segregate African
Americans from white voters8 6; and predicted that unchecked, race-based
districting may "balkanize us into competing racial factions."87
This hyperbolic language, in particular the political apartheid label,88
underscores the Court's top-down vision of racial identity. The Court suspects that political actors, whether the state or political elites, sometimes
manufacture a relationship between racial and political identity. In the
Court's view, racial identity does not have political significance until state
actors-to borrow from Aleinikoff and Issacharoff's illustration-roam
around the state in an attempt to classify voters according to their race.89
From the Court's perspective, state actors dictate on the basis of skin color
who should vote where and for whom.9" In part, the Court's reaction to
race-based identity claims can be understood as a rejection of the role
political elites are perceived to play in constructing and deploying racial
identity.
D. JudicialInterventionas Remedy
Given the Court's concerns about the relationships between racial and
political identity, its efforts to police the boundary between the two are not
surprising.9 The Court supports its decision to regulate the line between

82.
83.

Id.
See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.

84.

Aleinikoff & issacharoff, supra note 39, at 611-12; Higginbotham et al., supra note 11, at

1620-25

(criticizing

the

"political

apartheid"

analogy);

J.

MORGAN

KOUSSER,

COLORBLIND

INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION

377-96

(1999); Frank R. Parker, Factual Errors and Chilling Consequences: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno and

Miller v. Johnson, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 527 (1995-1996); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial
Redistricting: A Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REV. 1 (1995).
85.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Shaw 1).

86. Id. at 642,651.
87. Id. at 657; see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. See also Holder, 512 U.S. at 906 (Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing race-based districting
to racial registers).
89, See Aleinikoff& Issacharoff, supra note 39, at 615.
90. Id.at 629 ("Under any discretionary districting system, state authorities arrogate to
themselves the ability and authority to determine how representation will be allocated, and which
individuals or groups will be frustrated participants in the electoral marketplace.").
91.
As Professor Karlan observed, the "Court sees itself as the only institution capable of
resolving the difficult questions raised by the role of race in American democracy." Pamela S. Karlan,
Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore,

79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2001). See also M. Elaine Hammond, Toward a More Colorblind Society?
Congressional Redistricting After Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2151 (1997); James
U. Blacksher, Book Note, American Political Identity and History, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 715 (2001).
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race and politics on two grounds. First, the Court maintains that it has the
institutional responsibility to ensure that political actors comply with relevant constitutional provisions. In Miller v. Johnson, Justice Kennedy wrote
that "the judiciary retains an independent obligation in adjudicating" racial
gerrymandering claims to "enforc[e] the constitutional limits on race-based
official action. 9 2 Justice Kennedy explicitly relied upon Marbury v.
Madison93 and Cooper v. Aaron,94 quoting Marbury's famous apothegm

that "[i]t is emphatically
to say what the law is"
authority in Miller and in
Second, the Court

the province and duty of the judicial department
as justification for the majority's assertions of
the racial gerrymandering cases.95
assumes the responsibility, in its institutional

"backstop role,"96 for eradicating racial identity or reducing its effects on

the political landscape. As Justice O'Connor stated in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Company, the "ultimate goal" is "eliminat[ing] entirely from
governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human being's
race .. . . "I' Justice O'Connor returned to this theme in Shaw I, where she
asserted that "race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close
judicial scrutiny" because "it threatens to carry us further from the goal of
a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation
continues to aspire."98 Justice Kennedy sang the same refrain in Miller:
As a Nation we share both the obligation and the aspiration of
working [to eradicate] invidious discrimination from the electoral
process and [to] enhanc[e] the legitimacy of our political
institutions. Only if our political system and our society cleanse
themselves of that discrimination will all members of the polity
share an equal opportunity to gain public office regardless of race. 99
In sum, the Court has adopted a position in the debate over the role
law should play in the maintenance of racial identity. Although the Court
has equivocated in some of its opinions, it has often sided with those who
believe that racial identity is externally imposed by political elites and is
unidirectionally pernicious in its effect on the body politic. The inevitable
conclusion is that the Court should act to undermine the racial identity
framework whenever possible by excising racial identity from democratic
politics.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Miller, 515 U.S. at 922 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177, and Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18).
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996).
488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 320
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
98. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (Shaw 1).
99. 515 U.S. at 927.
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In this Part I have argued that to make sense of the Court's reaction to
the use of race in the design of electoral structures, one must come to terms
with the four main underlying premises of the racial districting cases. First,
the Court is skeptical of racial identity as a descriptive matter. Second, the
Court believes that state action on the basis of racial identity is essentialist.
Third, the Court objects to the role political elites play in constructing and
defining identity. Finally, the Court believes that it has an important role to
play in ridding the body politic of the pernicious effects of racial identity.
In the remainder of the Article I evaluate the merits of these underlying
premises.
II
UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY

Our initial inquiry is whether the Court is right to be skeptical of the
purported relationship between race and democratic politics. In contrast to
the Court's voting rights jurisprudence, social scientists understand group
identity as ubiquitous and necessary to social and political life. They take
as a given that groups, racial and otherwise, exist and are endemic to
human life.' 0 Such understandings undermine the Court's descriptive
claims about group identity from the outset.'
Moreover, the social psychology literature paints a picture of the individual different from the one the Court depicts in its race jurisprudence.
From the Court's perspective, the individual is the sole bearer of constitutional rights; thus, constitutional law is (and ought to be) blind to the individual's social identities. From this vantage point, courts adjudicate
constitutional rights without concern for social groupings. In contrast,
social psychologists view the individual as the product of her group identities. The combination of groups to which she belongs strongly influences
who the individual is, what she believes, and how she behaves.
Demonstrating a functional relationship between political and racial
identity, and addressing the constitutional implications of such a relationship, necessarily assumes the existence of something called group identity.
In this Part I make the social scientific case for the existence and function
of groups in social life. First, I review some important concepts from social

100.

JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION

THEORY 126 (1987) (noting the "social and psychological reality of groups and group behavior-social
groups do exist, individuals do identify with social groups, i.e., perceive themselves as group members,
and they do behave as group members rather than as individuals under certain conditions").
101.
Some legal scholars share the perspective of social psychologists on the question of identity.
See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007 (1991), Dean Johnson
understands identity from a communitarian perspective. He noted that "implicit in the communitarian
philosophy is an emphasis on the contextual-the individual is not viewed atomistically as the sum of
parts separate from others. Instead, the individual is viewed as part of the community, simultaneously
shaping the community to which he belongs and being shaped by it." Id. at 2056.
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psychology demonstrating that group identity is an intrinsic part of selfdefinition. Then I use empirical studies that examine the political behavior
and public opinion of African Americans to show how group identity can
influence political thought and political behavior.
A. Lessons from Social Psychology
12
What is the relationship between individual and group identity?
How does an individual cease to identify solely as an individual and begin
to identify with a particular social group? As an initial point of departure,
social psychology does not recognize the clear distinction reflected in the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence between the individual and the
group. The social psychological literature on the individual and the group
reveals a symbiotic relationship between the two.1" 3 Specifically, social
psychologists have concluded that the process by which individuals form
their self-identities is the same process by which they form their group
identities. Individuals arrive at their self-definitions through a cognitive
process of characterizing stimuli, which includes self-categorization as
well as other-categorization.
The process of categorization is central to the relationship between
self-identity and group identity because it is by categorizing that we make
sense of who we are and the world around us." 4 Categorization is a natural
102. The question of how individuals come to identify with a social group is the central focus of
two related areas of study in social psychology: self-categorization theory and social identity theory.
TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 42; see also Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A
Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 Soc. PSYCH Q. 255, 259-62
(1995). Generally, self-categorization theory explains how individuals come to define themselves in
terms of a social group. Social identity theory explains how social groups interact with one another and
their effect upon individuals. TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 42.

103.
Abrams and Hogg noted that
Social identity theory conceives of the self-concept as a collection of self-images which vary
in terms of the length of their establishment, complexity and richness of content, etc.
However, the important emphasis is that these self-images can be construed as falling along a
continuum, with individuating characteristics at the personal extreme and social categorical
characteristics at the social extreme .... When social identity is salient one acts as a group
member, whereas, when personal identity is salient, one does not.
DOMINIC ABRAMS & MICHAEL A. HOGG, SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL

ADVANCES 3-4 (1990). Turner and his colleagues usefully stated:
Social identity is, therefore, a 'socially structured field' within the individual mind, an
important element of the psychological or subjective processes of society. It is a mechanism
whereby society forms the psychology of its members to pursue its goals and conflicts as for
example 'citizens', 'Americans', 'Irish republicans', 'conservatives', 'socialists', or
'Catholics'. Its functioning provides group members with a shared psychological field, shared
cognitive representations of themselves, their own identity, and the objective world in the
form of shared social norms of fact and value and hence makes meaningful the simplest
communications and emotions of a public, intersubjective life.
TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 207.
104.
GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20 (1954). Allport maintained that

[O]ur experience in life tends to form itself into clusters (concepts, categories), and while we
may call on the right cluster at the wrong time, or the wrong cluster at the right time, still the
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and arguably inevitable phenomenon of human existence. 5 Human beings,
by necessity, categorize objects and people in their world.'0 6 Moreover, just
as people categorize cars and food, using the former for transportation and
the latter for sustenance, so too do they categorize people.'0 7 Similarly, the
"tendency to view others and oneself in terms of readily apparent group
categories helps individuals to establish a sense of both personal and social
identity by providing a basis for comparing themselves to the rest of
society."'0 8 The process of categorizing stimuli, which social psychologists
define as physical or social objects including the self, "serves the function
of rendering the world subjectively meaningful and identifies those aspects
relevant to action in the particular context."'0 9
Within this hierarchical system of classification, social psychologists
have generally identified three levels of self-categorization. At the highest
level of abstraction, in what Turner and his colleagues referred to as the
superordinate level of the self, we classify ourselves as members of the
human race." 0 At the intermediate level of abstraction, we classify others
and ourselves into in-groups and out-groups."' It is at this level that we
form and establish our social or group identities." 2 Finally, at the lowest
level of abstraction, what Turner and his colleagues referred to as the subordinate level of the self, and what I will refer to as individual or personal
identity, we characterize ourselves as unique individuals.' At this level,
we focus on the characteristics that set us apart from all others." 4
In contrast to the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
which accords individual identity primacy over social identity, social psychologists have found that the social group is "ontogenetically primary" to

process in question dominates our entire mental life. A million events befall us every day. We
cannot handle so many events. If we think of them at all, we type them.
Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at20-21.
Id. at20.
Conover, supra note 1, at 58-59.
Michael A. Hogg & Craig McGarty, Self-Categorization and Social Identity, in SOCIAL
IDENTITY TiEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE AND CRITICAL ADVANCES 12 (Dominic Abrams & Michael Hogg
eds., 1990).
l10.

TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 45.

Ill.
112.
1l3.

Id.
Id.
Id.

1 14.
Id. at 46. It is worth noting here another distinction between how the understanding of
individual identity varies between social psychology and the Supreme Court's doctrine. The Court
privileges individual identity over social identity. For the Court, personal identity is the individual's
true identity and the one protected by the Constitution.
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the individual's definition of himself or herself."5 Our group identities help
shape who we are, what we believe, and how webehave." 6
The individual arrives in a world in which there are already established categories." 7 He is born into many of these categories, and even
before he realizes it these categories begin to define him." 8 As part of the
individual's attempt to define himself and to make sense of his world,' he
processes his experiences by categorizing them in a manner consistent with
his group identities. 2 ° In the course of categorizing his experiences, he also
defines himself and gives content to his personal and social identities. 2' Of
course, the individual is not limited to the social identities into which he
was born. His social identities change, intensify, or diminish as he categorizes his experiences and responds to stimuli in his world.' This is the
process of self-categorization.2 3 By this process the "social world is
cognitively mapped in terms of prototypes of categories to which we
' 24
belong and those to which we do not belong."'
B.

African Americans and PoliticalIdentity

That our group identities are determined prior to our individual identities in social psychological development and that our unique combinations
of group identities define us provide a basis for questioning the Court's
viewpoint but not for rejecting it completely. The Court is certainly right to
object when state actors simply assume that because an individual is a person of color the individual will subscribe to certain political views and
share the same political interests as other people of color. This assumption
is indeed a demeaning stereotype of the worst kind.
However, how should the Court respond if state actors take race into
account because citizens of color have chosen to use their group identities
as a basis for political affiliation? As I explain in this section, the evidence
115. Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity and the Sovereignty of the Group: A Psychology of
Belonging, in INDIVIDUAL SELF, RELATIONAL SELF, COLLECTIVE SELF 123, 130 (C. Sedikides &
Marilynn B. Brewer eds., 2001); see also id. at 131.
116. Social psychology casts great doubt onto the neat distinctions drawn by constitutional and
liberal political theory between the individual and the group. Id. at 124 (stating that "groups have a
profound impact on us. They influence the attitudes we hold, and the way we perceive, feel, and act");
see also id. at 131-39; Hogg et al., supranote 102, at 259.
117. See ALLPORT, supra note 104, at 31. Individuals conceptualize social groups as
"prototypes: fuzzy sets of attributes that prescribe thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that capture
commonalities among people within a group and distinguish that group from other groups." Hogg,
supranote 115, at 131.
118. ALLPORT, supranote 104, at 30.
119. Hogg, supranote 115, at 134.
120. Id.at 132-33.
121.
Hogg et al., supra note 102, at 259.
122. TURNER ET AL., supranote 100, at 46-47.
123. Hogg et al., supra note 102, at 260.
124. Hogg, supranote 115, at 131.
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is overwhelming that group identifications significantly influence an individual's opinion and behavior. Perhaps more important, the influence of
social groups is not limited to social thought and behavior but extends to
political thought and behavior as well. Once a person has adopted (or
inherited) a particular group identity, she begins to interpret the world from
the perspective of this social group and to adopt its beliefs and behaviors. 25
126
Social psychologists refer to this process as "depersonalization."'
Through this process, the individual identifies with the social groups to
which she feels she belongs.' 27 The process also facilitates group behavior
and encourages individuals who share the same group identities to "think
alike.' 28
Moreover, the fact that members of the same group are likely to find
themselves occupying the same socioeconomic space facilitates group behavior and distinctive viewpoints by group members. 29 Individuals who
occupy a similar socioeconomic space are more likely to belong to the
same social groups. 30 They are also more likely to categorize themselves
and their experiences similarly. 3 ' Consequently, they are more likely to
think and to behave in the same way. 3 2 When individuals think and behave
in the same way, they tend to vote in the same way. To further illustrate
how social groups affect political alignment and behavior, in the next section I present empirical data comparing the partisan affiliation and public
opinion of African Americans and white Americans. I then discuss the origin of these racial differences.

125.
Id.
126.
TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 50-5 1. It is worth noting that depersonalization is not a
negative psychological experience. As Turner and his colleagues made clear, "[i]n many respects
depersonalization may be seen as a gain in identity, since it represents a mechanism whereby
individuals may act in terms of the social similarities and differences produced by the historical
development of human society and culture." Id. at 51.
127.
Hogg et al., supra note 102, at 261.
128.

The process is succinctly summarized by Michael Hogg and Craig McGarty:

First, people categorize and define themselves as members of a distinct social category or
assign themselves a social identity; second, they form or learn the stereotypic norms of that
category; and third, they assign these norms to themselves and thus their behavior becomes
more normative as their category membership becomes salient.
Michael A. Hogg & Craig McGarty, Self-Categorization Theory and Social Identity, in SOCIAL
IDENTITY THEORY: CONSTRUCTIVE & CRITICAL ADVANCES 15 (Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg

eds., 1990).
129.
Hogg et al., supra note 102, at 261. See also Michael Hughes & Steven A. Tuch, How Beliefs
About Poverty Influence Racial Policy Attitudes: A Study of Whites, African Americans, Hispanics and
Asians in the United States, in RACIALIZED POLITICS 189-90 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2001).

130.

See sources cited supra note 129.

131.
132.

TURNER ET AL., supra note 100, at 71-72.
Id.
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1. African Americans'PartisanAffiliation
Our inquiry here is whether there is an empirical relationship between
racial and political identity. One simple method of determining the existence of this relationship is to examine party identification for African
Americans. In this section I do so through use of the 2000 National
Election Studies (NES) and the 1996 National Black Election Study
33

(NBES).1

Table 1 shows the party identification of all respondents in the 1996
NBES who reported a party identification. As the table demonstrates, party
identification varies little among African Americans. Out of more than
eleven hundred respondents, forty-seven, or slightly over 4%, identified as
Republicans. In contrast, 74% of respondents identified as Democrats.
TABLE 1
PARTY IDENTIFICATION: AFRICAN AMERICANS

Party

Frequency

Percentage

Republican

47

4.19

Independent

239

21.32

Democrat

835

74.49

Total

1,121

The absence of variation in the party identification of African Americans
stands in sharp contrast to the political affiliations of white Americans.
Using data from the 2000 NES, Table 2 shows that party identification is
more evenly distributed among whites than among African Americans. Of
the white respondents, 44% identified as Democrats, 44% identified as
Republicans, and 11% identified as independents.

133. The NES is a series of nationwide surveys designed to show the opinion of the electorate on a
wide variety of public policy issues. The Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research
conducted the 2000 NES. The principal investigators were Nancy Bums, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J.
Rosenstone, Virginia Sapiro, and the National Election Studies. The dataset and codebook are both
available online at http://www.umich.edu/-nes/studyres/nes2000/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2002). The
entire archive is available at http://www.umich.edu/-nes (last visited Aug. 11, 2002). The NBES is
modeled after the NES, with the exception that the respondents are all African Americans. The NBES
is designed to provide information on the attitudes and political preferences of the black electorate. The
principal investigator for the 1996 NBES was Katherine Tate. For more information on the NBES,
including a copy of the dataset and codebook, see http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/archive.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2002).
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1233 2003

1234

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
TABLE

(Vol. 91:1209

2

PARTY IDENTIFICATION: WHITE AMERICANS

Frequency

Percentage

Republican

604

44.09

Independent

161

11.75

Democrat

605

44.16

Total

1,370

Party

Because these are univariate statistics, the relationship found between
African Americans and the Democratic Party may be spurious; the study
may have failed to control for other independent variables. Table 3 presents
the results of a multivariate logistic regression of party identification using
data from the 2000 NES. The independent variables are education, income,
gender, age, black racial identity, and Latino racial identity. As is evident
from Table 3, both black and Latino respondents are more likely than
whites to identify with the Democratic Party, even controlling for other
important variables such as income and education.
TABLE

3

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

13 4

Coefficient

SE

Z

P

Education

-.110

.037

-2.96

.003

Income

-.065

.019 -3.28

.001

Gender

.194

.114

1.69

.090

Age

.000

.003

.13

.894

Black

2.149

.295

7.27

.000

Latino

.614

.257

2.39

.017

Independent
Variables

These findings are consistent with those of previous researchers who
have examined the relationship between race and party identification
among African Americans. 135 For example, Professor Katherine Tate has
134. SE, standard error; Z, test statistic; P, probability that test statistic would take a value as
extreme as or more extreme than that actually observed.
135.

See, e.g., EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF

AMERICAN

POLITICS

(1989);

MICHAEL

C.

DAWSON,

BEHIND

THE
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noted that African Americans make up approximately 25% of the
Democratic Party's membership and since 1964 have become one of the
largest blocs in the party.136 As Professor Terry Smith remarked, "Blacks
are overwhelmingly Democratic."' 37 Thus, there is an empirically verifiable
38
relationship between race and political identity for African Americans. 1
2.

African Americans' Public Opinion

As may be expected, the racial effect on partisanship is not limited to
partisan affiliation. There is also a racial divide on public opinion, specifically on public opinion regarding matters related to race.' 39 Professor
Michael C. Dawson has noted that, for most issues, especially those related
to race and economics, African Americans are "the most politically liberal
group" in the United States. 4 ' The wide gulf between the public opinion of
African Americans and whites on racial and racially tinged issues has
drawn the attention of leading researchers in this area:
No doubt the most striking feature of public opinion on race is how
emphatically black and white Americans disagree with each other.
On the obligation of government to ensure equal opportunity, on
federal efforts to help blacks, and on affirmative action, a huge
racial divide opens up. Blacks and whites also disagree sharply
over policy questions that are racial only by implication, over how
generous the American welfare state should be, and over the
integrity of American political institutions. The racial divide in
opinion widens when whites talk with whites and blacks talk with
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 55 (1994); GURIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 87; TATE, supranote 2, at 50-

58.
136. TATE, supranote 2, at 50.
137. Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote Dilution and the
Preservationof the Second Reconstruction, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 277, 329 (1998).
138. African Americans do not have a blind adherence to the Democratic Party but identify with
the party that they believe best represents black interests. In fact, in a recent paper, the political
scientists Hajnal and Lee have concluded that "[n]o matter how African American partisan choices are
modeled, there is a clear and strong direction to the effects of group attachments. Those who believe
the American system is unfair and that their fate is linked to the larger black community are much more
apt to support the Democratic party." Zoltan Hajnal & Taeku Lee, The Multidimensionality of African
American Party Identification 22 (April 25, 2003) (paper, on file with the California Law Review); see
also DAWSON, supra note 135, at 108 ("Historically, large-scale shifts in African-American support for
political parties have been tied to perceptions of which party best advanced black interests.").
Moreover, African Americans do not limit their attachments to the two major parties. They are open to
third parties provided that those parties are concerned about black interests. For recent empirical
arguments on the multidimensionality of the partisan identifications of African Americans, see
MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN-AMERICAN
POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 10-43 (2001), and Hajnal & Lee supra. The classic work in the field remains
HANES WALTON JR., BLACK POLITICAL PARTIES: AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1972).
For a perceptive legal analysis, see Smith, supra note 10.
139.
HANES WALTON JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN
QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 65 (2000) ("The race gap is a chasm.").
140.
DAWSON, supranote 135, at 55.
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blacks, itself a sign of the difference race makes to our social and
political lives. It is as apparent among ordinary citizens as it is
among elites. It is not a mask for class differences: it is rooted in
race, in differences of history and circumstance that define the
black and white experiences. And if differences by race are nothing
new to American politics, they are, if anything, more dramatic now
than a generation ago.141
Figure 1 depicts the gap in public opinion on racial issues between
whites and African Americans; it shows their differences of opinion on
twenty public policy questions involving race. 4 2 Researchers solicited
opinions on affirmative action, on whether the position of African
Americans in American society is due to racism or the failure of African
Americans to work hard, and on the government's role in promoting integration. 4 3
FIGURE

1

PUBLIC OPINION ON RACIAL ISSUES

Source: 1992 and 1994 NES
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The difference in public opinion between whites and African
Americans is not limited to racial issues. A similar gap exists for issues
with a racial subtext-matters of public policy that individuals perceive to
141.

DONALD

R. KINDER & LYNN M.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

142.

SANDERS,

DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND

33 (1996).

Id. at 28. 1 thank David Canon for permission to use Figures 1 and 2 from DAVID T. CANON,
28-30 (1999).
KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 141, at 28.

RACE, REDISTRICTING & REPRESENTATION

143.
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disproportionately affect one race more than others, such as the death penalty, welfare programs, and food stamps.' As Figure 2 demonstrates,
whites are extremely conservative on issues with a racial subtext. In contrast, the distribution for African Americans is close to normal. The distributions indicate more variation in the public opinion of African Americans
than of whites on issues with a racial subtext. However, both groups leanin the case of whites, very heavily-in expected directions. These findings
clearly demonstrate that on racial and social welfare issues, African
45
Americans are very to relatively liberal and whites are very conservative.
FIGURE

2

PUBLIC OPINION ON IMPLICITLY RACIAL ISSUES

Source: 1992 and 1994 NES
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3. Accounting for RacialDifferences

Party identification and public opinion vary by race. Political scientists have concluded that racial identity is the best explanation for these
differences. 146 For most African Americans, racial group interests serve as
a useful barometer for evaluating public policy, political parties, and candidates.' 47 As Professor Dawson has explained, "the historical experiences
144. See CANON, supra note 142, at 28-29.
145.
See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 135, at 182 (noting "deep and profound political divisions
between blacks and whites"); KINDER & SANDERS, supra note 141, at 33 (presenting evidence of "a
deep and perhaps widening racial divide").
146. See, e.g., TATE, supra note 2, at 38-40; see also Johnson, supranote 23, at 1415 ("AfricanAmericans belong to a unique ethnic group. Their ethnicity simultaneously constitutes who they are
and separates them from whites who, although they belong to many different ethnic groups, do not and
cannot belong to the ethnic group composed of African-Americans.").
147. DAWSON, supra note 135, at 45-68. Professor Dawson referred to this belief system as
"linked fate." Id. at 77-84. Professors Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson referred to it as group political
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1237 2003

1238

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1209

of African Americans have resulted in a situation in which group interests
have served as a useful proxy for self-interest."' 48 Convincing empirical
evidence supports this proposition.'49
In Holder v. Hall, Justice Thomas protested what he characterized as
the Court's "pernicious" assumption that "race defines political interest."' 5 °
He noted that the Court's vote dilution cases accepted a correlation
between racial and political identity without inquiring "into the cause for
the correlation (to determine, for example, whether it might be the product
of similar socioeconomic interests, rather than some other factor related to
race) . . .
However, scholars who study race and politics have already searched
for the causes of the correlation between race and political identity. Professor Gurin and her colleagues have concluded that, even controlling for
class and many other relevant factors, racial identity is the best predictor of
both African American partisan identification and African American public
opinion on public policy questions with racial implications.' 52 Professor
Dawson reached a similar conclusion; in reporting the results of his study
on the relationship of African Americans to the Democratic and
Republican Parties, he noted:
It is evident that socioeconomic status is only weakly associated
with African-American evaluations of the two parties....
Socioeconomic status had no relationship to long-term AfricanAmerican party identification....
Perceptions of African-American racial and economic group
interests and their consequences, on the other hand, played an
important role.., in predicting both African-American party
identification and perceptions of which party best advances black
interests. '
consciousness. See GURIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 75-80. See also Pamela Johnston Conover, The
Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation, 46 J. POL. 760 (1984)
(describing the political impact of group identity). Although there are some methodological differences
between "linked fate" and group political consciousness, they are conceptually the same. Their core
contentions and findings are that most African Americans identify as African Americans and evaluate
public policy based on its impact on African Americans as a group.
148. DAWSON, supra note 135, at 77. Justice Marshall recognized that African Americans have a
shared historical experience: the "dream of America as the great melting pot has not been realized for
the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400-01 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
149. See generally DAWSON, supra note 135, passim; GURIN ET AL., supranote 1,passim; TATE,
supra note 2, passim. For the manner in which these concepts are empirically modeled and measured,
see DAWSON, supra note 135, at 71-95; GURIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 75-105; TATE, supra note 2, at
20-49; and Richard L. Allen et al., A Schema-Based Approach to Modeling an African-American
Racial Belief System, 83 AM. POL. ScL. REV. 441 (1989).
150. 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 904.
152. GURIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 109.
153.
DAWSON, supranote 135, at 115-16. See also TATE, supranote 2, at 40-42.
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Professor Tate noted that African Americans who most strongly identified
as African Americans reported the strongest affiliation with the Democratic
1 54

Party.

Perhaps the Court is correct to be skeptical of claims that racial identification completely defines the individual, and it is certainly right to insist
on empirical proof that racial identity and political identity are correlated.
But the Court is wrong, as an empirical matter, if it concludes that no relationship exists between racial and political identity. Whether the state
should be permitted to act upon racial differences is a normative inquiry
whose resolution is best facilitated via a discussion of the First Amendment
right of association.
III
THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

A. PoliticalAssociation: Contours andExposition
In his classic survey of early American life, Alexis de Tocqueville
remarked that the "most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting
for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his
fellow-creatures, and of acting in common with them."' 55 This observation
led Tocqueville to conclude that the "right of association is almost as
'
inalienable as the right of personal liberty."156
Many other political philosophers have also recognized the freedom
of association as a basic component of any democratic polis."' John Stuart
Mill argued that a necessary corollary of an individual's essential liberty is
the liberty of "combination among individuals" and the "freedom to unite,
for any purpose not involving harm to others."' 58 Similarly, John Rawls
included the freedom of association as a basic liberty of all individuals.'5 9
As Rawls explained, freedom of association is important to "secure the full
and informed and effective application of citizens' powers of deliberative
154. TATE, supra note 2, at 63-64 (finding that racial identity was the only predictor of partisan
affiliation and that "[s]trong racial identifiers are more likely to identify strongly with the Democratic
party than weak racial identifiers").
155.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 209 (Henry Reeve trans., Henry G.
Langley 1845) (1835). Tocqueville was not an unconditional proponent of the right of political
association. He stated that "if the liberty of association is a fruitful source of advantages and prosperity
to some nations, it may be perverted or carried to excess by others, and the element of life may be
changed into an element of destruction." Id.
156. Id.
157. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 15-16 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 291, 309, 313, 332-41 (1993); Michael Walzer, On Involuntary Association, in FREEDOM
OF ASSOCIATION 64 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) ("Freedom of association is a central value, a
fundamental requirement of liberal society and democratic politics."); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION
AND DEMOCRACY 18 (2000) (stating that the "democratic process requires freedoms of speech,
assembly, and association").
158. MILL, supra note 157, at 16.
159. RAWLS, supra note 157, at 191.
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reason to their forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of
the good over a complete life."'"6 Unequivocally, the freedom of association is an indispensable prerequisite of democratic societies.' 6 '
The right of association takes two forms. Association is both an intrinsic good and instrumental to the pursuit of other ends. As an intrinsic
good, freedom of association is "integral to a free human life, to being a
free person."' 6 2 The freedom of association is "essential for providing the
opportunity to individuals to live a good life and for constituting a just
society."' 63 On some accounts, the ability to associate with others is the
primary determinant of the good life.' 64
In addition to its intrinsic value, the freedom of association is necessary to the protection of other liberties. It enables the individual to pursue
lawful ends however he or she may define those ends. The ability to associate with others is also what enables citizens to participate in a democracy.' 65 In addition, the ability of individuals to associate with others for
whatever reason or no reason at all is self-definitional; individuals characterize and identify themselves by the types of associations they form and
by the people with whom they associate.' 66
Although freedom of association is a fundamental component of
democratic institutions, the Constitution references it obliquely at best.'67
160. Id.at 335.
161.
George Kateb, The Value of Association, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 36 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1998) ("In a constitutional democracy, people should have the right, recognized by government, to
associate ... for any appropriate purpose that does not harm the vital claims of others."); David Cole,
Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 Sup. CT.
REV. 203, 203-04 ("As a matter of democratic theory, the right of association is something we cannot
live without ... ").
162. Kateb, supra note 161, at 36.
163.
Amy Gutmann, The Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION 3, 7 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
164.
Consider the following portrait of civic life painted by Michael Walzer:
[T]he good life can only be lived in civil society, the realm of fragmentation and struggle but
also of concrete and authentic solidarities, where we fulfill E.M. Forster's injunction 'only
connect', and become sociable or communal men and women. And this is, of course, much
the best thing to be. The picture here is of people freely associating and communicating with
one another, forming and reforming groups of all sorts, not for the sake of any particular
formation-family, tribe, nation, religion, commune, brotherhood or sisterhood, interest
group or ideological movement-but for the sake of sociability itself. For we are by nature
social, before we are political or economic beings.
Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in DIMENSIONS OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY: PLURALISM,
CITIZENSHIP, COMMUNITY 97 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1992). See also ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK 113 (1997) ("Happiness is living in a civic community."); YOUNG, supra note 157,
at 189.
165.
For an empirical analysis of the factors affecting participation, see SIDNEY VERBA ET AL.,
VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1995).

166. For a powerful observation on the role of the right of association in protecting and defining
gay identity, see Carpenter, supranote 10, at 1525-32.
167.
But cf Cole, supra note 161, at 226 (arguing that "while the right of association is not
literally mentioned in the Constitution, it nonetheless finds solid textual support in the First
Amendment as the modem-day manifestation of the right of assembly").
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Nonetheless, Professor Daniel A. Farber has noted that it is "obvious that
the First Amendment must protect not merely the individual speaker but
also organized activities, ranging from political parties and media
organizations to protest committees and dissident groups.' ' 68 The Court
similarly has anchored protection for the right of association in both the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.' 69 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, the Court stated that "[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."' 70 The Court
has declared that the right of an individual to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment-specifically speech, assembly, petition for
redress of grievances, and exercise of religion-necessitates the recognition of a complementary right to associate with others in the pursuit of
various political, economic, and religious goals.' 7'
Roberts v. United States Jaycees illustrates the Court's current
approach to association.' In Roberts, the Court delineated two different
types of association protected by the First Amendment. The first type of
association, which the Court referred to as "intimate association,"' 73 is the
intrinsic feature of constitutionally protected association.' 74 It protects
one's "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human
relationships" that are "secured against undue intrusion by the State
because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual
freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme."' 75 The Court's concern here is the protection of familial relationships-marriage, procreation,

168.
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 225 (1998). See also Cole, supra note 161, at
203 ("[I]t is impossible to imagine a democratic society-much less the First Amendment rights of
speech, assembly, religion, and petition-without a corresponding right of association, so it is not
surprising that the absence of any explicit mention of association in the Constitution has proven little
barrier to recognition of the right.").
169. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1975).
170. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in
171.
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate
with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends."). See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973) (stating that the right of political
association is a "basic constitutional freedom"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) ("Among
the rights protected by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their
personal beliefs."). Professor McGowan traced the development of the modem doctrine to United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST.
COMMENT. 121, 126-30 (2001) (providing a history of the development of the right of association). See
also Cole, supra note 161, at 228.
468 U.S. 609.
172.
173.
Id. at618.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 617-18.
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raising and educating one's children, and cohabitation.'76 These types of
relationships are to be free from state regulation because they are where
"individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment" and where individuals "define [their] identity"-a process the Court finds "central to any
concept of liberty."' 77
The second type of association, termed "instrumental," or
"expressive,"' 7 8 recognizes the "right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion."' 79 We safeguard the freedom of association to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment and the Constitution because it is
"an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties."' 8 °
Although this right to associate is not absolute, "state action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the
closest scrutiny."''
The Court has also recognized a number of different types of association under the umbrella of instrumental or expressive association. Freedom
of expressive association protects the ability of a group to advocate both
public and private viewpoints.'8 2 As the Court has noted, individuals
"associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends."' 83 Moreover, the state
cannot discriminate among the various types of associations the individual
enjoys. The Court stated in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pattersonthat "it is
immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters ....
"84 Protecting the various forms of associations is "important in preserving political
and cultural diversity."' 85 As Justice Rehnquist put it in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, protecting the right of association "is crucial in
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would
'
rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas." 186

176. Id. at 619.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 618.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See also Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1982) (describing the analytical process a court must use to evaluate
First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state election laws).
182.
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,15
(1976).
183. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. But see Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (holding that city
ordinance limiting use of dance halls to 14- through 18-year-olds does not violate right of association).
184. 357 U.S. at 460.
185. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
186. 530 U.S. at 647-48.
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Despite the importance of the right of political association, it has
played no role in the development of the Court's race-based voting rights
jurisprudence. The Court has relied exclusively on equality-based principles of individual rights and harm and has ignored relevant liberty-based
principles of individual rights and harm. Perhaps more significant, the
principles ignored are countervailing; that is, they might orient the Court's
race and representation jurisprudence in a different direction than that suggested by equality-based notions of rights and harm. Although both courts
and commentators have largely ignored these principles, the Court should
take them into account as it develops its racial districting jurisprudence.
In this Part, I analyze the Court's political association cases and conclude that these cases are relevant to the Court's race and representation
jurisprudence. Part III.B provides a hypothetical to show how the right of
association applies to electoral structures. Part III.C argues that the Court's
political association cases are applicable to electoral structures and explores how the design of electoral structures might unconstitutionally burden associational rights. This Part concludes that the Court should take the
right of association into account in analyzing the constitutionality of race
consciousness in the design of electoral structures.
B.

Setting Up the Problem: The HypotheticalState of Bliss

Suppose a state, which we will call Bliss, recently admitted to the
Union as the fifty-first state, had one hundred residents prior to the 2000
census, 80% of whom were white. The state has a bicameral legislature,
which consists of an upper chamber, the Senate, and a lower chamber, the
House. Five House members are elected via five single-member districts.
Of the five districts, one district is a majority-minority district-a district
in which the majority of voters are citizens of color. There are also five
Senators, who are similarly elected. Bliss has two political parties: the
Center-Left Party (LP) and the Center-Right Party (RP).
Seventeen of the state's twenty voters of color are members of the LP.
Half of Bliss's residents are registered members of the RP. Figure 3 depicts
the districting scheme in effect during the 1990s, which shows that
Blissians of color were geographically concentrated in the southeast comer
of the state.
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The 2000 census reveals that Blissians of color are now fairly dispersed throughout the state. After examining the voting behavior of the
state's citizens and analyzing the results of a number of public opinion
polls, social scientists have concluded that Blissians of color are distinctly
more liberal than white Blissians on racial and social welfare issues, particularly those with racial implications. In addition, white Blissians, regardless of their party identification, are measurably more conservative on
racial and social welfare issues than are Blissians of color; party identification cannot accurately predict the opinions of white Blissians on race and
social welfare issues.
The Bliss legislature is currently debating two different redistricting
plans: the Race-Blind Plan and the Race-Conscious Plan. The Race-Blind
Plan adopts race-blind districting as a traditional districting principle. It
prohibits the use of any data that include racial demographic information
for the purpose of redistricting. The legislature would continue to use
single-member districts as the electoral structure. Considerations of constitutional equality rather than animus against Blissians of color motivate the
Race-Blind Plan. Figure 4 depicts the Race-Blind Plan.
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In contrast to the Race-Blind Plan, the Race-Conscious Plan would
mandate race consciousness in redistricting where the legislature has evidence that racial identity correlates significantly with political identity. To
maximize the voting strength of Blissians of color, the Race-Conscious
Plan would replace single-member electoral districts with a cumulative
voting system.' 7 Considerations of political association motivate the RaceConscious Plan. Everyone agrees that if the legislature adopts the RaceBlind Plan, Blissians of color will not be able to elect a representative of
their choice. The parties also agree that if the legislature adopts the
187. In a cumulative voting system, voters cast the same number of votes as there are seats.
Because Bliss has five seats, the Race-Conscious Plan would permit all voters to cast five votes. Voters
can also combine the votes in any way they want. Thus, they can cast five votes for one candidate or
cast their votes in combination for multiple candidates. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 3, at 10991102; Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 249, 255-

58 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). Cumulative systems guarantee some measure of representation to
cohesive political minorities, provided they cast all of their votes for one candidate and they surpass the
threshold of exclusion-the minimum size a political minority must be to control at least one seat. "The
formula for the threshold of exclusion under cumulative voting is 1/(I+N)+I, where N is the number of
seats to be filled. Thus, with five seats at stake and five votes to cast, a minority that casts one vote
more than 1/(1+5), or one vote more than one-sixth of the total vote can control the outcome of one
seat." ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supranote 3, at 1102. See also Still, supra, at 256.
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Race-Conscious Plan, Blissians of color may be able to elect at least one
representative of their choice, provided they are politically cohesive.
This hypothetical provokes two distinct questions. First, can Bliss
adopt the Race-Blind Plan without violating the associational rights of
Blissians of color? Second, if the legislature adopts the Race-Conscious
Plan, does the First Amendment provide it with a constitutional defense of
its choice of a race-conscious redistricting plan over a race-blind alternative?
C. PoliticalAssociation and ElectoralStructures
The first question that must be addressed is whether the Supreme
Court's freedom of association cases are applicable to electoral structures.
A skeptic might argue that as long as Blissians of color may meet, freely
discuss politics, use their resources to persuade others, and get a candidate
on the ballot with reasonable effort, the requirements of the First
Amendment are satisfied. This skeptic might also argue that the Court's
freedom of association cases are uniquely concerned with expressive private associations, and, because electoral structures are not "expressive,"
they are not entitled to First Amendment protection.
1. The Right ofAssociation Protects an Individual's Ability to Aggregate
PoliticalPower
Although the Court has not precisely defined the contours of its
expressive association doctrine, 8 s its analysis has focused on the instrumental or functional nature of the expressive claim: the extent to which
putative expressive activity facilitates the individual's ability to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment.'89 The Court has explored the
impact state action is likely to have on citizens' right of political association in relation to the role that political association plays in safeguarding
political rights in a representative democracy.1 90
Consider NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.'' In that case, the
state of Alabama attempted to quash the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People's (NAACP's) civil rights activities in the
state by filing suit against the organization on the grounds that the NAACP
was doing business within the state without proper registration.' 92 The state
sought production of several documents, including the names and

188.
Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1498 (2001) ("So far, the Court has given us a series of examples
[of expressive associations] without any defining principle.").
189. See infra text accompanying notes 191-260.
190. See id.
191.
357 U.S.449, 451-52 (1958).
192. Id.
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addresses of all Alabama residents associated with the NAACP.'9 3 The
NAACP refused to comply on the grounds that the First Amendment right
of association protected it from compelled disclosure of its membership
lists. The trial court disagreed and held the NAACP in contempt of court.
The Alabama Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that members of
the NAACP were entitled to "pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs
which they.., have the right to advocate."' 94 The Court then evaluated the
governmental action in light of its likely effect on the associational rightthe plaintiffs' collective propensity to engage in the political process.95
While emphasizing the functional relationship between the right of association and representative democracy, the Court remarked that "[e]ffective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association."'' 96
The Court reasoned further that the state's actions were likely to have
a detrimental effect on NAACP members' right of association and their
concomitant ability to advocate for their beliefs.'97 It worried that the
state's disclosure order might "induce members to withdraw from the
Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure
of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences
of this exposure."' 98 Because of the substantial impact of the state's disclosure order on NAACP members' right of association, the Court subjected
the state's order to strict scrutiny. 199
Consider also NAACP v. Button.0 0 In that case, Virginia amended one
of its statutes in order to prevent the NAACP from soliciting plaintiffs for
civil rights lawsuits.2 0 ' The NAACP filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute violated the First Amendment. The central question in
the case was whether soliciting and engaging in litigation are forms of association."' 2
The Court concluded that the First Amendment right of association
protected the NAACP's activities. It reasoned that "[i]n the context of
NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of
193.
Id.
194. Id. at 463; see also id. at 460 ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
195. Id. at 460-61.
196. Id. at 460.
197. Id. at 462.
198. Id. at 463.
199. Id.; see also id. at 460-6 1.
200. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 428-29.
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treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of
the Negro community in this country. '"203 The Court went on to explain
why associating for purposes of engaging in litigation is a form of political
association, at least in this context. It said that although the ballot is the
usual method of political association,0 4 when that avenue is not available
for certain groups, they have no choice but to "turn to the courts."2 5 It then
observed that "under the conditions of modem government, litigation may
well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances."20 6 The Court concluded that the First Amendment
right of association protected the litigation activities of the NAACP
because litigation is a method of political association and participation. The
statute at issue thus unduly burdened the associational freedoms of black
voters because it prohibited them from associating for the purpose of
engaging in litigation.
The Court's instrumental approach to resolving state interference with
associational rights in Pattersonand Button is not aberrational. In a slew of
cases that I shall refer to as the "political association cases," the Court has
used the right of association to determine whether individuals, private
groups, and political entities are entitled to greater access to the political
process and the instrumentalities of the political process such as electoral
ballots. 2 7 As these cases demonstrate, in protecting political association,
the First Amendment protects more than mere private association2 8 ; the
First Amendment's protection also extends to election laws that burden the
individual's right to make free choices and to associate politically through
the vote. The main principle of the political association cases is that of
effective aggregation: an individual must have a reasonable opportunity to

203.
Id. at 429.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 430.
207. The political association cases include Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); Jenness v. Fortson,403 U.S. 431 (1971); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973);
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441
(1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Illinois State
Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S.
191 (1979); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin
ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290
(1981); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983);
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990);
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); and Federal Election
Commission v. ColoradoRepublican Federal Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
208. See infra text accompanying notes 211-60.
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join with like-minded others for the purpose of acquiring political power."'
Stated differently, association enables individuals to amplify their voices to
further common political beliefs. °
Let us begin with Kusper v. Pontikes. 1 In Kusper, the Court struck
down an Illinois statute that prohibited a voter from voting in the primary
of a political party if she had voted in the primary of another political party
within the preceding twenty-three months.2 12 The plaintiff in this case
voted in the Republican primary and unsuccessfully attempted to vote in
2 13
the Democratic primary the following year.
After recognizing the applicability of the First Amendment freedom
of association to the Illinois law in question," 4 the Court noted that the
statute substantially restricted the voter's ability to change her party
affiliation.2"5 The Court then examined the purpose of political parties in
the U.S. electoral system and commented that "a basic function" of political parties is to select candidates for presentation to the voters at the general election. 16 Voters associate themselves with a political party in great
part "to gain a voice" in the choice of candidates for public office.217 The
Court concluded that the Illinois statute unduly burdened the voter's right
of association because the statute prevented the voter "from participating at
all" in the primary of her choice.21 8 The state deprived the voter "of any
voice in choosing the party's candidates, and thus substantially abridged
her ability to associate effectively with the party of her choice."2 9
In another case, Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, the plaintiff challenged a California initiative that limited campaign expenditures
and contributions.2 ° The plaintiff organization, assembled to oppose a ballot measure that would have imposed rent control on some of the city's
rental units, violated the contribution limit and was fined by the state

209. See Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 883 (1995) ("To
be effective, a voter's ballot must stand a meaningful chance of effective aggregation with those of
like-minded voters to claim a just share of electoral results.").
210. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1917, 1922
(2001).
211.

414 U.S. 51 (1973).

212. Id. at 68-69.
213.
Id. at 52.
214. Id. at 56-57 ("There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.").
215. Id. at 57 (noting that "[t]he effect of the Illinois statute is thus to 'lock' the voter into his
pre-existing party affiliation for a substantial period of time following participation in any primary
election, and each succeeding primary vote extends this period of confinement").
216. Id. at58.
217.

Id.

218.

Id.

219.
220.

Id.
454 U.S. 290, 292-93 (1981).
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regulatory commission. 22 ' Although the plaintiff prevailed before the lower
courts, the California Supreme Court reinstated the fines.222
The United States Supreme Court reversed, remarking that the ordinance had a distinctive impact on associational rights. 223 "Under the...
ordinance an affluent person can, acting alone, spend without limit to
advocate individual views on a ballot measure. It is only when
contributions are made in concert with one or more others in the exercise
of the right of association that they are restricted by" the ordinance. 2 4 It
concluded that the ordinance's exclusive and disproportionate impact on
collective activity unduly burdened the plaintiffs right of association. The
Court stated that "the practice of persons sharing common views banding
together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American
political process. '"225 Association is important because "by collective effort
individuals can make their views known, when individually, their voices
would be faint or lost.

'226

The ordinance burdened associational rights be-

227
cause it impermissibly "hobble[d] the collective expressions of a group"
and diminished "the right of people to make their voices heard on public

issues.

' 221

Kusper and Citizens Against Rent Control show that an electoral law,
rule, structure, or device that significantly burdens the individual's right to
make free choices and associate effectively through the ballot impairs the
individual's right of association. This understanding sheds light on a number of political association cases that are otherwise difficult to explain,
such as Anderson v. Celebrezze.229 In Celebrezze, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of Ohio's early filing deadline. Ohio required independent
candidates who wanted a place on the ballot to declare their candidacy earlier than candidates nominated by political parties.23 The plaintiffs,
Anderson and a diverse group of voters, argued that the early filing dead231
line violated their right of association and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court agreed.
The Court's analysis in Celebrezze is important and interesting in
many respects. First, although the deadline denied the candidate access to
the ballot, the Court focused on the denial's impact on voters. Its main

221.

Id.

222.

Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 614 P.2d 742, 749 (Cal. 1980).

223.
224.
225.

Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 294.

226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 296.

228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 295.
460 U.S. 780 (1983).
Id. at 780-83.
Id. at 783.
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concern was protecting the voter's right to associate in order to advance a
political candidate and to further the voter's political beliefs.232
Second, the Court acknowledged that a wide variety of electoral rules,
structures, and laws indirectly suppress associational activities. The Court
noted that states enact "comprehensive and sometimes complex election
codes" that regulate almost all aspects of the electoral process. 233 Each
regulation "inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's
right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. 234
Thus, the associational claim is not limited to certain types of laws or electoral structures but is potentially applicable to all aspects of the electoral
process.
Third, although the Court recognized that exclusion of candidates
from electoral ballots burdened two different rights-the right to vote and
"'the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs'" 235-the Court declined to rest its decision on the Equal Protection
Clause.2 36 This move is significant because the Court had decided a substantial number of ballot access cases prior to Celebrezze principally on
equal protection grounds.237 Thus, in that regard, Celebrezze is a marked
departure from precedent.
By abandoning an equal protection analysis in favor of a political association analysis, the Court indicates that something more is at stake here
than a right to express oneself politically through the vote. The Court did
not protect political association simply because association facilitates political expression; rather, association is also valuable because it enables the
voter to maximize his or her ability to acquire political power.
Admittedly, the Court did not articulate this point in Celebrezze with
the utmost pellucidity. Consider the Court's explanation for the proposition
that exclusion of candidates burdens associational rights. The Court reasoned that "an election campaign is an effective platform for the expression
of views on the issues of the day, and a candidate serves as a rallying point
'
for like-minded citizens."238
From that explanation, one might conclude
that the purpose of political association is only to provide a platform for
political expression: expression for the sake of expression. Consequently,
political association would be facilitated to the extent that voters are able to
discuss the issues of the day and find a candidate to rally around.
232. Id. at 806; see also id. at 786.
233. Id. at 788.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
236. See id. at 786-87 n.7 (noting the Court's decision not to "engage in a separate Equal
Protection Clause analysis").
237. Id.; see also I11.State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Am.
Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
238.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788.
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However, it would be shortsighted to conclude that Celebrezze and the
political association cases more generally are concerned solely with political expression.2 19 The Court's true explanation emerged in the footnote
supporting the proposition that Ohio's early filing deadline burdened associational rights. Quoting from Williams v. Rhodes, the Court stated that
"'the right to form a party for the advancement of political goals means
little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an equal
opportunity to win votes.'

24 °

The Court also quoted Harlan's concurrence

to the opinion, in which he maintained that by denying minor parties "any
opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the President is
selected, the State has eliminated the basic incentive that all political
parties have for conducting such activities."2 '' The Court continued to emphasize this theme in the text, where it suggested that the problem with the
early filing deadline was that it limited the chances of a distinct group of
voters-"independent-minded voters"-to associate and thus strengthen
their effectiveness as a group. 42 This restriction "threaten[ed] to reduce
diversity and competition in the marketplace of ideas. 243
The Court's reliance upon the right of association as a justification for
its decision in Celebrezze makes sense when one acknowledges the unique
contribution of the right of association to an analysis of political rights.
Celebrezze is not about the right to vote or cast a ballot; if it were, the
Court would have more properly grounded its decision in the Equal
Protection Clause.244 The case is also not about the right of the individual
239. See, e.g., Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196 (1st Cir. 1973) ("[T]he freedom to associate is
intimately related with the concept of making expression effective.").
240. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 788 n.8 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 31).
241.
Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
242. Id.at 794.
243. Id.
244. Although a full description of the topic is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
pointing out the superiority of the First Amendment right of association approach over the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection approach to voting rights. First, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment
approach is mired in controversial concepts such as individual rights versus group rights and vote
dilution, these and analogous concepts are widely accepted as necessary to the right of association.
Second, as a number of commentators have noted, the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
reflects a crabbed conception of political rights that focuses almost exclusively on the vote. See, e.g.,
Tucker, supra note 11,at 415-26. In contrast, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence reflects a
more expansive approach to political rights beyond the formal right to vote. See Samuel Issacharoff,
Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan
Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 290 (2001) ("The First Amendment is increasingly seen as both
instrumental in securing the conditions necessary for democratic governance, and as a participatory
vehicle for greater citizen involvement in public discourse."). Thus, the Court has protected as political
activity ballot access, political party autonomy, and the right to contribute to political campaigns. Third,
while the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has helped to provide access to the political
process for voters of color, the Court has not reliably protected the political rights of voters of color. A
First Amendment-centric approach to political rights would take into account the political rights of
voters of color without focusing exclusively on race. Finally, although a right to vote flows awkwardly,
if at all, from the Fourteenth Amendment, a right to vote is critical to core First Amendment values
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to express herself politically; if it were, the Court would have analyzed it as
a freedom of expression case. By moving away from the Equal Protection
Clause and toward political association and by focusing on voters as opposed to candidates, Celebrezze clarified the contours of the right of political association. The right focuses on the voters and their ability to wield
political influence.24 5 The early filing deadline impaired associational rights
precisely because it limited the opportunity of an identifiable group of like2 46
minded voters to acquire political power.
Although in Celebrezze ballot access was an indispensable prerequisite, the associational claim need not be so limited.2 47 The Court's recent
political association cases have more explicitly emphasized the consequential or instrumental nature of the associational right. For example, in
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Republican Party challenged a Connecticut statute that prohibited a voter from voting in a party
primary unless the voter was a registered member of that party.248 The
Republican Party adopted a party rule to encourage independent voters to
vote in Republican primaries, 49 The party rule clashed with the state statute, which required a closed primary. 5 The plaintiffs argued that the statute "impermissibly burden[ed] the right of its members to determine for
themselves with whom they will associate, and whose support they will
seek, in their quest for political success." 25' The plaintiffs maintained that
the state reduced their ability to acquire political power by precluding them
from seeking the support of putative like-minded others.
The Court agreed and noted that the statute curtailed the pool of individuals with whom the plaintiffs could associate, thereby denying them the
opportunity to "broaden the base of public participation in and support for

such as self-government and autonomy. If these values are to be meaningful, the right to vote must be
the center of any viable theoretical constellation of political rights.
245. As the Court stated in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000),
"[r]epresentative democracy in any populous unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of
citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political
views." See also Abrams, supra note 11, at 473-75.
246. The Court explained:
As our cases have held, it is especially difficult for the State to justify a restriction that limits
political participation by an identifiable political group whose members share a particular
viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status. "Our ballot access cases ... focus on
the degree to which the challenged restrictions operate as a mechanism to exclude certain
classes of candidates from the electoral process. The inquiry is whether the challenged
restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the 'availability of political opportunity."'
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 792-93 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974))).
247. See infra text accompanying notes 260-86 (arguing that any electoral device may burden
associational rights).
248. 479 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1986).
249. Id. at 212.
250. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-431 (1985), amended by 1987 Conn. Acts 509, § I (Reg. Sess.).
251.
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214.
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[their] activities. '252 Limiting the plaintiffs' pool of potential associates
denied them the ability to "'identify the people who constitute the

association, ''25' a necessary component of "the freedom to join together in
furtherance of common political beliefs. 254 In other words, the state restricted the plaintiffs' ability to appeal to individuals who might be of simi-

lar political orientation or who could be persuaded to support the plaintiffs'
cause. 255 The Court then concluded that the state "limit[ed] the [Party's]
associational opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to
common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to
politicalpower in the community."256
An additional important lesson to be drawn from Tashjian, Kusper,
and perhaps political association cases more broadly is that political

winners and losers-defined as both people (candidates) and ideas-ought
to be the product of the political marketplace and political competition. 7
One characterization of the problem in Tashjian and Kusper is that the
state sought to determine political outcomes, as opposed to allowing the
political market to dictate political outcomes, by reducing political competition through limiting the pool of individuals the plaintiffs could reach out
to for political support. 258 The state stunted the process of democracy. The
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981)).
254. Id. See also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989); La
Follette,450 U.S. at 122.
255.
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215-16 ("The statute here places limits upon the group of registered
voters whom the Party may invite to participate in the 'basic function' of selecting the Party's
candidates.").
256. Id. at 216 (emphasis added). For other cases conducting similar analyses, see California
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
257. This lesson may simply be an application of a greater value of democratic self-govemance
identified by Professor Post. See Post, supra note 10, at 279; see also Robert Post, RecuperatingFirst
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1275 (1995). Professor Post explained that First
Amendment doctrine "seeks to sustain the value of self-government by reconciling individual and
collective autonomy through the medium of public discourse." Id. "[T]he function of public discourse
is to reconcile, to the extent possible, the will of individuals with the general will. Public discourse is
thus ultimately grounded upon a respect for individuals seen as 'free and equal persons."' Post, supra
note 10, at 284. Individuals cannot be free and equal if the state is coercing their consent. See DoN
HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 199 (1989). Consequently, it is sensible
for the Court to police strictly the channels of democracy, the medium through which consent is
procured.
258. On this score, I agree with Professors Issacharoff and Pildes, who emphasized the relevance
of political competition to legitimating political outcomes. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff,
Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff,
Gerrymandering]; Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 686 (2002);
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 8, passim; Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of PoliticalCompetition, 85
VA. L. REV. 1605, 1616 (1999). Their argument is based upon the important insight that "democratic
politics... is not an autonomous realm of parties, public opinion, and elections, but a product of
specific institutional structures and legal rules." lssacharoff& Pildes, supra note 8, at 644.
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political association cases are clearly concerned with the possibility of
political elites biasing political outcomes in their favor by the259manner in
which they structure democratic institutions and electoral rules.
As the political association cases reveal, the First Amendment protects an individual's right to associate politically through the vote and otherwise. 26 ° This right is burdened impermissibly when a state law, rule, or
electoral structure denies an individual the reasonable opportunity to join
with like-minded others for the purpose of furthering common political
beliefs.
2. The Right of Association Applies to Electoral Structures
Nothing about electoral structures should remove them from the purview of the First Amendment. In fact, the Court acknowledged in Anderson
v. Celebrezze that each provision of state-enacted election codes affects to
"'
some degree the rights to vote and to associate for political reasons.26
Moreover, courts and commentators have long recognized that the composition and makeup of democratic structures affect political rights, in particular the right to vote.262
As a starting point for the argument that the right of association
applies to electoral structures, let us examine more specifically the relationship between voting as a political activity and the design of democratic
structures. 63 As many commentators have recognized, although voting is

259.
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO.
L.J. 491, 522 (1997).
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
260.
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-29 (1974); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); see also Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 771 (3d Cir. 2000); Sowards
v. Loudon County, Tenn., 203 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir. 2000); Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133,
1154 (11 th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
261.
460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) ("District lines are rarely neutral
262.
phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly
Republican, or make a close race likely."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559-60 (1964); Wesberry
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 14 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting
Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 1386 (2002) (discussing incumbency
Politics
in
Doing
Our
Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer,
voter
redistricting);
via
protection
Court: Gerrymandering, "Fair Representation" and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 527, 536 (2003) [hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics in Court] (describing
the inherent tensions in the redistricting process); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third
Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 301, 310 (1991) (noting the necessarily partisan nature of redistricting); James Thomas
Tucker, Redefining American Democracy: Do Alternative Voting Systems Capture the True Meaning
of "Representation"?, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 357, 360-64 (2002) (explaining various alternative voting
systems and their effect on voters' political rights).
263.
Note that even though this discussion is about voting, my arguments are intended to apply to
political participation more broadly. Voting is important in this discussion not only because of the
central role it plays in a democratic society but also because it is a useful stand-in for thinking about
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in part a symbolic act, 264 it is more than a ritual significant solely for its
expressive or signifying value. 26 51 Voting is also a consequential political
act with attendant and intended political ramifications.266 In other words,
voting is instrumental. 67 Consider the following observation by Professor
Guinier: "the right to vote is a claim about the fundamental right to express and represent ideas. Voting is not just about winning elections. People participate in politics to have their ideas and interests represented, not
simply to win contested seats. 268 Consider also Professor Karlan's
insight on this issue: "the functional point of voting is to aggregate
individuals' preferences and to allocate political power (and ultimately the
benefits and burdens the government confers) among groups.269 Put differently, "the right of the individual to participate politically is a right best
realized in association with other individuals, i.e., as a group. '"270

political participation in a democratic polity. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 35 (2000) ("Voting is by a substantial margin the

most common form of political activity, and it embodies the most fundamental democratic principle of
equality.... Moreover, like the canary in the mining pit, voting is an instructive proxy measure of
broader social change."). See also HERZOG, supra note 257, at 199-213.
264. James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political
Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 906 (1997) ("To seek the
vote is to seek formal recognition as a full member of society; to be denied the vote is to be either
excluded altogether from membership in the community or consigned to some kind of second-class
citizenship."); HERZOG, supra note 257, at 219 ("For having the right toparticipate in politics identifies
one as a full member of the community; it recognizes and so helps constitute one as a dignified
equal."); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1724 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 451 (1989); JUDITH N. SHKLAR,
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 26 (1991) (stating that the act of voting is "an

affirmation of belonging"). For an argument on the dignitary underpinnings of the Reconstruction
Amendments, see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 11,at 928-35.
265. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 11, at 924-25 ("Voting is much more than an assertion
of dignity or an expression of belief."); see also id. at 922 (describing the "hybrid nature of voting");
Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) (drawing a distinction between the formal and functional importance of the right to
vote).
266. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1707-08 (1993).
267. As the political scientists Wolfinger and Rosenstone have stated, "[e]lections are at the core
of the American political system. They are the way we choose government leaders, a source of the
government's legitimacy, and a means by which citizens try to influence public policy. And for most
Americans, voting is the only form of political participation." RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J.
RoSENSTONE, WHO VOTES I (1980).

268.

LANI

GUINIER,

THE

TYRANNY

OF

THE

MAJORITY:

FUNDAMENTAL

FAIRNESS

IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 93 (1994).

269. Karlan, supra note 11, at 1711; see also Amar & Brownstein, supranote 11, at 925 ("Voting
is about the exercise of power."); Karlan, supra note 11, at 1708, 1711-14.
270. GUINIER, supra note 268, at 125. See also Gerken, supra note I1, at 1677 ("[A]n individual's
ability to aggregate her vote with others matters in a representative democracy.").
HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1256 2003

2003]

RACIAL IDENTITY AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURES

1257

An electoral structure, such as a voting district, is both a metaphysical
space 271 and a physical space 272 that the state creates. In this regard, an elec-

toral structure is indistinguishable from other state laws that regulate the
voting process, such as laws that create ballots and govern their use. The
structure's principal purpose is to facilitate political self-governance,
political representation, and political communication.2 73 As one commenta274
tor noted, "[r]edistricting is about power, its allocation and reallocation.
Electoral structures accomplish their purpose by aggregating the votes of
individuals on the basis of the state's perception of voters' common inter275
ests.
Democratic structures affect an individual's ability to aggregate his
vote with others and thereby maximize his political power in a number of
ways.2 76 First, the choice of an electoral structure itself-whether singlemember system, at-large system, cumulative voting system, or something
else-can profoundly affect an individual's ability to aggregate his or her
vote with others.277 For example, some scholars have debated whether atlarge systems more so than single-member systems diminish the voting
power of voters of color.278 Others argue that certain types of structures
271. But a metaphysical space is not ipso facto worthy of less constitutional protection. See
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995).
272. The following instruction from Richard Fenno, a political scientist who conducted a study of
members of the House of Representatives, convinced me to change my initial intuition, which was to
characterize election districts as constituting only metaphysical spaces. Fenno wrote:
[The district is] the entity to which, from which, and within which the member travels. It is
the entity whose boundaries have been fixed by state legislative enactment or by court
decision.... We capture more of what the member has in mind when conjuring up "my
district," however, if we think of it as the geographicalconstituency. We then retain the idea
that the district is a legally bounded space, and emphasize that it is located in a particular
place.
RICHARD F. FENNO JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 1 (1978).
Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Single-Member District System: Can It Be Reformed?, 70 NAT'L
273.
Civ. REV. 255, 255 (1981) ("An ideal local government electoral system should maximize effectiveness
of ballots cast, voter participation at the polls, responsiveness of elected officials, access to decision
makers, equity in representation and legitimization of the governing body."). See also Henry L.
Chambers Jr., Enclave Districting,8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135, 153-58 (1999).
274. Alan Gartner, New York City Redistricting: A View from Inside, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING
IN THE 199OS 367 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998).

275. Gerken, supra note 11,at 1679.
276. As Professor Abrams rightly reminds us, "political participation is not a single event, but a
temporally extended process that begins with reflection on and formulation of substantive preferences
and continues through the implementation of those preferences through the efforts of elected
representatives." Kathryn Abrams, Relationshipsof Representationin Voting Rights Act Jurisprudence,
71 TEx. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1993).
277. Zimmerman, supra note 273, at 255 ("The various types of electoral systems.., measure up
differently in terms of... canons of a good electoral system.").
278.
Compare Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Effect of At-Large Versus
District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR

203, 220-25 (Bernard Grofman & Arend Lijphart eds., 1986) (finding that
districted elections increase descriptive representation for African American voters but may not
necessarily improve governmental responsiveness), Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
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facilitate voter turnout.279 There are other scholars who note that the combination of single-member districts and plurality voting results in the hegemony of two parties to the near exclusion of third parties. 280 These
studies do not even begin to exhaust scholarly examinations of the political
consequences of electoral structures.28'
Second, how one draws district lines can also affect the aggregation
right, even after one has chosen a particular structure-for example, the
single-member system. 282 Here, too, the literature is quite voluminous.
Some scholars argue that the manner in which district lines are drawn predictably favors one political party at the expense of another.283 Others
explain how districting may inure to the benefit of incumbents.284 Still others demonstrate how electoral line drawing may dilute the votes of voters

Underrepresentation of Blacks on City Councils: Comparing the Structural and Socioeconomic
Explanationsfor South/Non-South Differences, 44 J. POL. 1088, 1089-90 (1982), and Susan Welch,
The Impact of At-Large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and Hispanics, 52 J. POL. 1050,
1051-53 (1990) (finding that African Americans are best represented by district elections but that they
are making gains in at-large systems), with Charles S. Bullock Ill & Susan A. MacManus, Staggered
Terms and Black Representation, 49 J. POL. 543, 544 (1987), and Charles S. Bullock Ill & Susan A.
MacManus, Testing Assumptions of the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Test: An Analysis of the Impact
of Structures on Black DescriptiveRepresentation, 21 AM. POL. Q. 290 (1993).
279. See, e.g., Robert W. Jackman, Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial
Democracies, 81 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 405, 407-09 (1987); Jeffrey A. Karp & Susan A. Banducci, The
Impact of ProportionalRepresentationon Turnout: Evidence from New Zealand,34 Aus. J. POL. SCl.
363 (1999); Richard J. Timpone, Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States, 92 AM.
POL. SCi. REV. 145, 145-46 (1998).
280. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE (1962). For refinements of Duverger's view, see William H. Riker, Duverger's Law
Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 19 (Bernard Grofman & Arend
Lijphart eds., 1986).
281.
See DAVID M. FARRELL, COMPARING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 1 (1997) (noting that at least
twenty-five hundred studies address the political consequences of electoral structures).
282. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 18-20
(1988). Piven and Cloward maintained that politics is a "dynamic" process. Id. at 20. By "dynamic"
they mean that the types of electoral structures affect the types of people who participate, which in turn
affect the types of electoral structures that affect the types of people who participate, and on and on.
Assuredly, a fair amount of political activity occurs across electoral structures, but electoral structures
serve to cabin or determine the scope of political communication in important ways. For example,
one's district in significant part determines for whom one votes. Similarly, although voters may contact
politicians who do not represent them, they are more likely to contact representatives within their
districts. Voters may contribute to candidates' campaigns outside their districts, but they are more
likely to contribute to candidates within their districts. Voters may engage in get-out-the-vote efforts
outside their districts, but they are much more likely to do so within their districts.
283.
DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE E. CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES (1992); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002);
Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the PartisanEffects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 320, 320-22
(1985).
284. Cox & KATZ, supra note 283, at 127-40 (noting that the reapportionment revolution may
have increased, at least in part, the incumbency advantage); Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing
Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting,88 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 541 (1994).
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of color and political minorities. 285 A number of scholars have addressed
the policy implications of majority-minority districts.286
The conclusion is inescapable: the type of political structure profoundly impacts the associational rights of the electorate. 287 The design of
democratic structures may burden associational rights in the same manner
that the initiative in Citizens Against Rent Control or the denial of ballot
access in Celebrezze burdened associational rights. Similarly, electoral
structures may impede the individual's ability to gather political power in
the same manner as the state statute in Tashjian or the primary rule in
Kusper did. Just as ballot access is critical to the associational functions of
individuals and political parties, electoral structures are crucial to the ability of groups of voters to aggregate their political power and exercise legislative influence. Consequently, electoral structures come within the ambit
of the First Amendment right of association because they may limit
285.

BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL,, MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST

FOR VOTING

EQUALITY (1992); MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989); Frank Parker, Racial
Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, supra; QUIET
REVOLUTION

IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,

1965-1990 (Chandler

Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
286.
Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Estimating the Impact of Voting-Rights-Related
Districting on Democratic Strength in the U.S. House of Representatives, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING
IN THE 199OS 51 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1998); CANON, supra note 142, at 93-142; Charles Cameron et
al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM.
POL. SCi. REV. 794, 795 (1996); David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Measuring the Electoral and
Policy Impact of Majority-Minority Districts, 43 AM. J. POL. 367 (1999); Kevin Hill, Does the Creation
of Majority-Minority Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in
Eight Southern States, 57 J. POL. 384, 387 (1995); DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF
REPRESENTATION:

RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS

IN CONGRESS (1997). We

can include here some important work by David Canon and his colleagues arguing that the manner in
which state actors construct majority-minority districts affects the choices of potential candidates,
which in turn profoundly affects the type of representation that voters will enjoy in those districts. See
supra note 142, at 93-142; David Canon et al., The Supply-Side Theory of Racial
Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians, 1972-1992, 58 J. POL. 846, 848-51 (1996). Claudine
CANON,

Gay's recent article is also quite important. She found that white Americans in majority-minority
congressional districts are more likely to be less politically engaged, presumably a function of their
minority status, when their representative is African American than when he or she is some other race.
Additionally, Professor Gay's study concluded that African American voters in majority-minority
districts are not more likely to be politically engaged than those in other districts. Thus, majorityminority districts had a negative effect on the political behavior of whites and no effect on the political
behavior of African Americans. See Claudine Gay, The Effect of Black Congressional Representation
on Political Participation, 95 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 589 (2001). Finally, in their study of the impact of
black constituency size on the policy interests of African Americans, Vincent Hutchings and his
colleagues explored the effect of the size of the black constituency on white representatives. They
concluded that Southern white representatives and Northern white representatives were affected
differently by the racial compositions of their districts. Among Southern whites, black constituency size
had some effect but the results were not consistent. Among Northern whites, black constituency size
did not affect the representative's support for policies that are important to the black community.

However, it did reduce the variance of support for those interests. See Vincent Hutchings, Harwood
McClerking & Guy-Uriel Charles, Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the
Importance of Stability (forthcoming JOURNAL OF POLITICS 2003).
287.
See supratext accompanying notes 265-70.

HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1259 2003

1260

CALIFORNIA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 91:1209

political participation by impermissibly burdening the individual's ability
to aggregate with like-minded others to exercise political power.
3. How Electoral Structures Might Burden AssociationalRights
Returning to the hypothetical Bliss, we can now understand why
adoption of the Race-Blind Plan impairs the associational interest of
Blissians of color in violation of the First Amendment. The plan burdens
their associational rights because it significantly limits their ability to
aggregate their vote with like-minded others for the purpose of acquiring
political power.288 As I have argued in this Part, individuals who utilize the
ballot-and certainly those who vote alike-are engaged in a collective
political enterprise."' The plan significantly reduces the instrumental effectiveness of Blissians of color by splitting their votes and depriving them of
the political power that they could wield in an alternative electoral structure.
The plan burdens associational rights in a number of ways that implicate the Court's political association jurisprudence. First, like the electoral
law at issue in Anderson v. Celebrezze, adoption of the Race-Blind Plan
would burden the associational freedom of an identifiable group of voters."' The electoral change represented by the Race-Blind Plan would disproportionately impact Blissians of color because the plan would make it
more difficult for them than for white voters to associate politically. The
group here is defined not simply by race but by the product of the interaction between race and ideology.29 Thus, as in Celebrezze, this group of
voters "share[s] a particular viewpoint, [an] associational preference," and
perhaps the same socioeconomic status.292
Second, the Race-Blind Plan suffers from the same defect the Court
found troubling in Kusper v. Pontikes.293 Recall that in Kusper the Court
explained that the Illinois statute-which prevented the voter from changing partisan identification for twenty-three months-burdened the voter's
right of association because the statute "lock[ed] the voter into his
pre-existing party affiliation for a substantial period of time following

288. Once again, 1 am using voting both illustratively and because of its democratic importance.
Similar arguments can be advanced using other means of political participation.
289. GUINIER, supranote 268, at 125; SHKLAR, supranote 264.
290. 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983).
291. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986) ("A showing that a significant number of
minority group members usually vote for the same candidates is one way of proving the political
cohesiveness ....
");GUINIER,supra note 268, at 94; Michael A. Hess, Beyond Justiciability: Political
GerrymanderingAfter Davis v. Bandemer, 9 CAMPBELL L. REV. 207, 234 (1987) ("The most readily
identifiable voting group is one based on political affiliation and voting patterns."); see also Hess,
supra, at 234 n.128.
292. 460 U.S. at 793.
293. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
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participation in any primary. '"294 As the Court understood the Illinois statute, the problem was that the state, rather than Mrs. Pontikes, chose Mrs.
Pontikes's political status. The state effectively communicated to Mrs.
Pontikes that she would be a Republican for the next twenty-three months
whether she liked it or not. 295 If she wanted to associate with the Democrats
she would have to wait twenty-three months and not vote in any primaries
in the meantime.296
The Race-Blind Plan is similarly flawed. As in Kusper, the state,
rather than the individual, is choosing the individual's political status. The
state is effectively telling Blissians of color that they will be a political
minority. If Blissians of color wish to associate with one another so as to
affect their political status they must wait at least until the next decennial,
provided they live within sufficient geographic proximity of one another.
This is the type of lock-in the Court found troubling in Kusper.297
Third, the effect of the Race-Blind Plan's colorblindness requirement
would be to limit the ability of voters of color to identify like-minded others at a crucial moment in the process. As the Court recognized in Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the ability to acquire political power is
predicated upon the ability to appeal to likely allies.298 Unfortunately for
Blissians of color, the state reduced the pool of potential allies in the RaceBlind Plan. The state's choice of electoral structure would remove the most
likely candidates with whom Blissians of color could associate. The RaceBlind Plan would violate the principle that it is the individual who can
choose with whom to associate and whom to solicit as potential political
associates or allies. Had the state chosen a less restrictive electoral structure, Blissians of color might have chosen different associates than those
dictated by the state.
We can now see how the Race-Blind Plan interferes with the First
Amendment right of political association, which protects the freedom of
individuals to join together in the pursuit of common political ends. As the
Court stated in Citizens Against Rent Control, the "practice of persons
sharing common views [and] banding together to achieve a common end is
deeply embedded in the American political process.... Its value is that by
collective effort individuals can make their views known, when
294. Id.
at 57.
295.
Id. at 57-58.
296. Id.
297. To be clear, I am not arguing that voters-of color or otherwise-have a right to be political
majorities. The point here is simply that the state cannot determine political power. As I have explained
in this Article, one of the principles of the political association cases is that the state cannot take it upon
itself to determine political winners and losers. See supra text accompanying notes 256-59. The
political marketplace must make these determinations. The state unconstitutionally burdens the right of
political association when the state, through its choice of laws and structures, unduly impacts political
outcomes.
298.
479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
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individually, their voices would be faint or lost. ' 299 Through political participation, citizens "band together in promoting among the electorate
candidates" to represent them and the policies that reflect their political
views.30 0 The key here is that the state's choice of electoral structures can
facilitate or inhibit an individual's attempt to acquire political power by
combining his or her political interests with those of like-minded others. A
democratic structure that interferes with the individual's ability to engage
in this collective endeavor unduly burdens the individual's freedom of
association.
The First Amendment, particularly the right of association, is relevant
to the design of democratic structures. Specifically, where race and political identity correlate, the state cannot design electoral structures that
unduly burden the associational rights of voters of color. This is an important step, but it is not enough. Although the state's design of democratic
structures implicates the First Amendment and may infringe the associational right of particular voters, it does not automatically violate the First
Amendment.30 ' Before reaching this conclusion, we must first discern the
state's interest in choosing certain electoral structures over others.
IV
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND IDENTITY: EXAMINING STATE INTEREST

State action that burdens associational activity is unconstitutional
unless the state is regulating pursuant to a compelling interest and the law
is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.30 2 Although a state's interest in
promulgating a specific electoral structure is difficult to surmise in the
abstract, a fundamental objection to race consciousness in the design of
democratic structures is that race-conscious state action violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, one of the state's best objections and its most
compelling argument for erecting colorblind electoral structures is an
equality interest.
The state can justify its assertion of an equality interest upon a number of grounds. For example, the state may believe it has a general interest
in promoting equality or in fulfilling the Constitution's command to equality by insisting upon colorblindness. The proposition here is that American
society's ultimate goal, as reflected in the Constitution, is one of colorblindness. Although we may take necessary detours in the attainment of
299. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
300. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
301.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
302. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (stating that state action that interferes with expressive
activity violates the First Amendment unless the state is regulating pursuant to "compelling . . .
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms") (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
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that goal,3"3 colorblindness is nevertheless set forth as the ideal toward
which we must always strive.3 °4 This colorblindness rationale is amply
reflected in the Court's voting rights jurisprudence.
The state might also argue that it is justified in failing to recognize
racial bases for political association because racial identity is balkanizing
and divisive. This argument, too, finds much support in the court's racial
districting cases,30 6 especially Shaw "307Consequently, given the divisive
nature of racial identity in our society, the state may argue that it should
not recognize racial bases for political identification.
Lastly, the state might argue that it has a compelling interest in conveying the message that race should not be a basis for political identity. As
the Court has often stated in its racial districting cases, when the state takes
race into account in the designs of political structures of representation, it
"convey[s] the message that political identity is, or should be,
predominantly racial. 30 8 Commentators have referred to this conception of
injury in the Shaw I line of cases as an "expressive harm. ' 3 9 "An
expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or
material consequences the action brings about."3 1 The expressive harm in
Shaw I was that the state used "race in the redistricting context in a way
that subordinate[d] all other relevant values[;] the state ... impermissibly
endorsed too dominant a role for race."3 1'
All of these grounds-colorblindness, divisiveness, and expressive
harms-support the proposition that use of race in the design of electoral
303. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way.").
304. See supratext accompanying notes 83-87.
305. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927-28 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)
(Shaw 1) (criticizing racial gerrymandering as contrary to the goals of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and the nation as a whole). See also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment); id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment).
306. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 912; Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 906-07 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 657; Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1963) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
307. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 657 (stating that using race as a basis for political identification "may
balkanize us into competing racial factions").
308. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996). See also id. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Shaw
1, 509 U.S. at 647-49.
309. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1539 (2000) ("The harms are expressive because they
are not tied to material injuries to specific individuals in the same way that harms involved in
conventional individual rights cases are tied to discrete injuries .... Rather, the problem is that certain
districts convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial."); Pildes,
supra note 3, at 2505; Pildes & Niemi, supranote 41, at 506-15.
310.
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 41, at 506-07.
311. ld. at 509.
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structures violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The contention that race is
an impermissible basis for state action undergirds not only the Court's voting rights jurisprudence3 12 but also its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence more generally. 3 As Professor Forde-Mazrui has observed, "the
Court increasingly takes the normative position that race is irrelevant and
unrelated, even statistically, to any other characteristics, and that
government policies ought not act upon any assumptions to the
contrary."3" 4 The Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment as a handmaiden in furthering its quest to eradicate race as a basis for official state
decision making.3" 5 The voting rights context is only the latest frontier
upon which this battle has been waged.
However, regardless of the merits or demerits of the use of race in
other contexts, voting is different.3" 6 As Professor Pildes has explained,
[T]he challenge for.., those who would endorse a categorical, per
se bar on the use of race or race consciousness in the [design of
electoral structures] ... is to explain why, when majoritarian power
is permissibly diffused to ensure more adequate representation of
various minority interests in so many other settings, the singular
interest for which this process should not be permitted-indeed, for
which it should be constitutionally prohibited-is where the
interest is defined in racial terms.317
This challenge becomes even more daunting when one factors important
First Amendment interests into the analysis.
Until now, most commentators have assumed that an equality right is
the only constitutional principle at issue in the design of electoral structures. Consequently, previous scholarship in this area has not discussed
whether and to what extent the First Amendment affects the equality principle. I argue that where racial identity and political identity intersect, the
state's invocation of an equality interest cannot automatically trump the
individual's equally important liberty interest. In this Part, I review three
cases that presented a compelling equality right-Buckley v. Valeo, 18
R.A. V v. St. Paul,319 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.32 ° These cases

312. See supratext accompanying notes 18-90.
313. For a brief survey that also includes the Court's voting rights cases, see Kim Forde-Mazrui,
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2354 (2000)
("All racial classifications are inherently 'suspect' and subject to strict scrutiny.").
314. Id. at 2355.
315. But see Grutter v. Bolinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2338 (2003) ("Although all governmental uses
of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it.").
316. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 11.
317.
Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 119, 130 (2000).
318.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
319.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).

320.

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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span the gamut of First Amendment doctrine. Buckley addressed political
association and expression, R.A. V. dealt with free expression, and Dale
grappled with expressive association. In each case, the First Amendment
right superceded a very strong equality right.
A.

The Equality Right CannotAutomatically Trump the Liberty Right
Buckley v. Valeo presented a First Amendment challenge to key
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.321 The Act
restricted the amount of money individuals, political parties, and political
action committees could contribute to candidates seeking federal offices322
and limited the amount of money they could spend on federal elections.323
The plaintiffs challenged the Act on the grounds that it infringed their First
Amendment rights to free speech and free association. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit largely upheld the amendments, with one exception,3 24 on the grounds that two compelling governmental interests motivated the Act: "equaliz[ing] ...the relative ability of
all voters to affect electoral outcomes" and curbing the appearance of corruption in the financing of elections.325
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the "Act's contribution
and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities."32' 6 It is useful to examine closely the Supreme
321. 424U.S. at6.
322. Id.at 7.
323. Id. at 7, 12-13.
324. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
325. Id. at 841. The Court of Appeals stated:
The principle of equality in political suffrage rights has the constitutional footing of the "one
man, one vote" principle.... It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the
basic rights of individuals, the wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a
stronger political voice than the unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend
more money, and because the amounts they give and spend cannot be limited.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
326. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). The Court went on to explain that even though both
the contribution and expenditure limitations implicate First Amendment interests, the limits on
expenditures "impose significantly more severe restrictions" on First Amendment rights than the limits
on contributions. Id. at 23. Although Buckley has been roundly criticized, the criticism has generally
centered on the Court's decision to draw a line between expenditures and contributions. For example,
Professor Briffault, one of the more perceptive and persistent critics of Buckley, nevertheless
grants: "Buckley rightly reminded us that campaign finance involves speech and associational activities
protected by the First Amendment." Richard Briffault, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC: The Beginning of the End of the Buckley Era?, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1729, 1760 (2001)
[hereinafter Briffault, Beginning of the End]. For a sample of some important criticism of Buckley, see
John C. Bonifaz et al., Challenging Buckley v. Valeo: A Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 39 (1999);
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1751,
1759-64, 1774-76 (1999); Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 368-72 (1995); Harold
Leventhal, Courts and Political Thickets, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 370-71 (1977); Kirk J. Nahra,
Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56
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Court's response to the equality interest and anticorruption-in-government
interests in Buckley. The Court of Appeals described this equality right as
follows:
By reducing in good measure disparity due to wealth, the Act tends
to equalize both the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral
outcomes, and the opportunity of all interested citizens to become
candidates for elective federal office. This broadens the choice of
candidates and the opportunity to hear a variety of views.327
Relatedly, the court emphasized the government's concern with corruption
in campaign finance, events that also contributed to promulgation of the
Act.328 As the court understood the political context that spurred electoral
reform, the "escalation of the 1972 election and the shock of its aftermath
led to a call for comprehensive corrective measures. ' 32 9 The 1972 elections
were embroiled in allegations of corruption and the undue influence of
moneyed interests in politics. The rising costs of campaigns, the dependence of candidates on large donors, and the evidence of corruption were
not lost on the citizenry.33 ° Citing polling research from the University of
Michigan's Center for Political Studies, the court documented a decadelong decline in political trust among the citizenry.331
This decline in political trust threatened to extinguish that which
"nourishes and invigorates democracy": widespread participation in the
political process. 31 2 From the perspective of the Court of Appeals, this
strong equality right, animated by its public-regarding purpose, trumped
any consideration of the liberty or associational interests claimed by the
Buckley plaintiffs.333 For that court, the availability or applicability of the
First Amendment right inversely depended upon the compelling nature of
the state's public-regarding and equality-reinforcing goal.
This approach stands in sharp contradistinction to the Supreme
Court's approach. Whereas the Court of Appeals focused on the importance of the Act and its equalizing effect,334 the Supreme Court focused on

FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 67-76 (1987); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth
Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'v REV, 273, 314-30 (1993); J.Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of
Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 610-12
(1982).
327. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (1975), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
328. See id. at 836-38.
329. Id. at 837.
330. Id. at 837-40.
331.
Id. at 838-39.
332. Id. at 835.
333. Id. at 842 ("To the extent that prohibitions and restraints-imposed by the Act in service of
the compelling government interest in insuring the integrity of federal elections against undue
influence-work incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms, these constraints, broadly
considered, are necessary to assure the integrity of federal elections.").
334. Id. at 835-42.
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the First Amendment rights at stake. 335 The Court not only framed the
question as implicating the First Amendment right to free speech3 3 6 but also
specifically drew attention to the effect of the campaign finance measures
' Whereas the Court of
on the plaintiffs' right to "political association."337
Appeals concluded that the Act's burden on associational and expressional
rights was incidental,33t the Supreme Court found that the Act placed
"substantial and direct restrictions"339 upon the right of expression and the
right of association.34 ° The Court stated that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."3 4'
The Court ultimately concluded that the strength of the equality claim
could not insulate the Act from First Amendment scrutiny.342 In other
words, the equality right did not automatically trump all other interests.
The Court reaffirmed the approach of Buckley in R.A. V.v. St. Paul,343
and in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.3" In R.A. V., the defendant was
charged under a city antibias ordinance after he burned a cross in the yard
of an African American family in St. Paul, Minnesota.3 45 The defendant
challenged the ordinance on First Amendment grounds. The Minnesota
335.
Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 14, 48-49 (1976) (noting that the First Amendment does not
tolerate restricting the speech of some for the benefit of others); Briffault, Beginning of the End, supra
note 326, at 1734 ("But Buckley rejected the argument that campaign money could be restricted in the
name of political equality, whether the equality of political influence among individuals or groups, or
the equality of candidates' resources.").
336. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
337. Id. at 15.
338.
Buckley, 519 F.2d at 842.
339. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
340. Id. at 18 (The "Act's contribution and expenditure limitations impose direct quantity
restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political
parties.").
341.
Id. at 48-49.
342. But see Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401-02 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting that "those words cannot be taken literally... [because] the Constitution often
permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from drowning out the many").
Note the Supreme Court's response to the reliance of the Court of Appeals upon United States v.
O'Brien. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840. In O'Brien, the Court stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The Court in Buckley rejected the characterization
of the campaign finance regulations as simply regulating conduct with only incidental burdens on First
Amendment interests. 424 U.S. at 16-17.
343. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
344. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
345. 505 U.S. at 379-80. The statute provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization
or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
St. Paul, Minn. Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990).
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Supreme Court upheld the charge and construed the ordinance to reach
only "fighting words" based upon race, color, religion, or gender.34 6 In the
Minnesota Supreme Court's view, the Constitution did not protect these
expressions.347 It agreed with the city's defense of the ordinance as necessary to give effect to a compelling equality right and to guard the human
rights of those historically subjected to discrimination.34 8
The United States Supreme Court reversed on many grounds, including the content-based discrimination in the ordinance.349 Although the
Court agreed that the state was regulating pursuant to a compelling interest,35 ° it concluded that the state's means were not sufficiently narrowly
tailored.35 '
In many respects, the issue of race consciousness in electoral structures is analogous to the issue of racist speech. Both problems pose
difficult challenges to significant constitutional principles and reflect the
"tension between the constitutional values of free speech and equality.""35
A strong equality claim motivates hate speech regulation.353 Compelling
evidence of the harm suffered by victims of hate speech justifies its regulation.354 Moreover, the most vulnerable and marginalized members of our
society bear the brunt of hate speech.355 Yet, despite the Constitution's
strong commitment to the principle of equality,356 a commitment that
should be particularly solicitous to the plight of African Americans, both

346. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380-8 1. Fighting words are "personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). See also EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND POLICY ARGUMENTS 178 (2001).
347. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 380-81.
348. Id.
at 395.
349. Id. at 391.
350. Id. at 395.
351.
Id. at 395-96.
352.
Lawrence, supra note 10, at 434.
353.
See generally Delgado, supra note 10, at 140 n.40; Lawrence, supra note 10, passim;
Matsuda, supra note 10, passim.
354.
Delgado, supra note 10, at 143-49 (recounting harms of hate speech); Lawrence, supra note
10, at 457-66 (noting "psychic," "reputational," and "denial of equal educational opportunity" as
injuries suffered by victims of hate speech); Matsuda, supra note 10, at 2336-41 (recounting harms of
hate speech); Post, supra note 10, at 272-77 (recognizing five basic harms of racist speech).
355.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 10, at 472 ("Whenever we decide that racist hate speech must
be tolerated because of the importance of tolerating unpopular speech we ask blacks and other
subordinated groups to bear a burden for the good of society-to pay the price for the societal benefit
of creating more room for speech."); Matsuda, supra note 10, at 2376 ("[W]hen victims of racist speech
are left to assuage their own wounds, we burden a limited class: the traditional victims of
discrimination. This class already experiences diminished access to private remedies such as effective
counterspeech, and this diminished access is exacerbated by hate messages.").
See, e.g., Paul Brest, In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90 HARv. L. REV. 1, 6
356.
(1977) ("Stated most simply, the antidiscrimination principle disfavors race-dependent decisions and
conduct-at least when they selectively disadvantage the members of a minority group.").
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the Court and the academe have concluded that the equality claim is not
sufficient to overcome the stronger First Amendment right. 57
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale also presented a compelling equality
358
right. In Dale, James Dale, a former scout, sued the Boy Scouts after the
organization revoked his membership when it learned he was gay.359 Dale
argued that his expulsion violated New Jersey's antidiscrimination statute. 36 ° The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed.36' The court maintained that
the state "has a compelling interest in eliminating 'the destructive
consequences of discrimination from our society."'3 62 The Boy Scouts
appealed to the United States Supreme Court and argued that forced inclusion of Dale would violate their right to expressive association.363
The United States Supreme Court held for the Boy Scouts. The Court
explained that enforcement of the antidiscrimination principle would
impermissibly curtail organization members' right of association.3 64 It concluded that "[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey's public
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy
3 65
Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association.
Each of these three cases presented a formidable equality claim. In
each case, the state argued that its equality interest trumped the individual's
First Amendment interest. In each case, the state lost. Extending the analysis to the design of electoral structures, the state cannot automatically use
the equality principle to justify race blindness in the design of democratic
structures where racial identity and political identity correlate. If the state
unduly burdens an individual's First Amendment right, in this case a right
to political association, the state cannot, on the grounds of promoting
greater equality, deprive the individual of his or her right to associate.
I do not argue that the associational right invariably trumps the equality right. The equality right, depending upon the context and the electoral
structure at issue, may be sufficiently compelling to overcome the individual's liberty right. My claim has two dimensions. First, the associational
right is a relevant consideration in resolving the constitutionality of democratic structures. Second, the equality right does not automatically trump the
357. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 10, passim.
358.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
359. Id. at 643-45.
360. Id. at 645.
361.
Id. at 646.
362.
Id. at 647 (quoting Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 764 A.2d 1196, 1227 (N.J. 1999)). Moreover,
in similar contexts the Court has held that antidiscrimination laws advance compelling state interests.
See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (stating that the state's "strong historical
commitment to eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available
goods and services ... plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest order").
363.
530 U.S. at 647.
364. Id. at 659.
365. Id.
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associational right. What we have is a clash of two important and at times
competing constitutional interests.t
B.

California Democratic Party v. Jones and the Importance of
PoliticalAssociation
The equality right is an important constitutional right, but so is the
associational right. Both should be considered seriously. California
Democratic Party v. Jones shows the Court's attention to the associational
right in particular.366 In Jones, the plaintiffs challenged a California proposition that changed the state's primary election from a closed primary367 to
a blanket primary. 68 The district court held that the state's interest, which
was to "enhance[] the democratic nature of the election process and the
representativeness of elected officials," justified the proposition.36 9 Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the proposition imposed a
severe burden on plaintiffs' right of political association.37 °
Because the state's electoral structure, the blanket primary, severely
burdened plaintiffs' freedom of political association,37" ' the Court rejected
seven interests advanced as rationales for using the blanket primary: making elected officials more representative of their constituents,
expanding political debate outside partisan boundaries, ensuring the effective voting rights of the disenfranchised, promoting fairness, increasing
voter options, boosting voter participation, and protecting voter privacy.372
The Court summarily rejected the state's first two asserted interestshaving more representative elected officials and expanding political
debate-on the ground that they were "nothing more than a stark
repudiation of freedom of political association. 373 It made clear that the
state cannot burden the individual's associational right simply because the
state does not like how the individual associates or the choices the

366. 530 US. 567 (2000).
367.
In a closed primary "only persons who are members of the political party... can vote" for
the party's nominee. Id. at 569.
368. Id. at 571. In a blanket primary any eligible voter, whether a member of the party or not, may
vote in the party's primary. Id. at 570.
369. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
370. Jones, 530 U.S. at 577-80.
371.
The Court stated:
Proposition 198 forces petitioners to adulterate their candidate-selection process-the "basic
function of a political party"-by opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with the party.
Such forced association has the likely outcome-indeed, in this case the intended outcomeof changing the parties' message. We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's
associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Id. at 581-82 (internal citation omitted).
372. Id. at 582-86.
373. Id. at 582.
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individual makes. 374 The Court rejected the:third asserted interest, effective
representation for the disenfranchised, on essentially the same ground.375 It
said that a state cannot favor the equality interests of disenfranchised persons over the interests of other citizens because doing so is tantamount to
privileging one group of individuals "simply because the State supports
it."'3 76 The Court rejected the remaining four interests on the grounds that
they may not be sufficiently compelling and, even if they are compelling,
the electoral structure is not narrowly tailored to advance them.377 The
Court thus concluded that California's proposition was unconstitutional
because it violated citizens' right to political association.
Jones, one of the Court's most recent political association cases, indicates the Court's solicitude for political association. State electoral laws or
structures that burden associational rights are unconstitutional unless they
are narrowly tailored and serve a compelling state interest. As I have
argued in this Part, although equality may be a compelling state interest, it
does not ipso facto supercede the individual's associational right. In fact, if
Jones is an accurate predictor of the Court's future analysis, states cannot
construct electoral structures essentially on the grounds that they are
uncomfortable with the fact that voters of color are associating on the basis
of their race. Where states construct electoral structures and those structures burden the associational right of voters of color, the colorblindness
rationale may not be a sufficiently compelling state interest to survive strict
scrutiny.
V
IMPLICATIONS

I have argued thus far that the First Amendment ensures racial groups
the right to meaningful participation in the political process. When state
actors design democratic institutions, they must be race conscious if there
is a functional relationship between racial and political identity. The equality right is compelling but does not presumptively overcome the individual's liberty right. The question then is to what extent a state must facilitate
or maximize political identity along racial lines. Suppose one is concerned
that bizarrely shaped districts inflict maximum costs on all other nonracial
bases for political identification.378 Are such concerns extraneous in light of
the First Amendment right of political association? Moreover, what can a
374. Id. (characterizing the state's position as tantamount to the proposition that "[plarties should
not be free to select their own nominees because those nominees, and the positions taken by those
nominees, will not be congenial to the majority").
375.
Id. at 583.
376. Id.at 584.
377. Id.at 585.
378. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (Shaw 1)(using the term "bizarre districts" for
the first time).
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state do if it is concerned about the ostensibly corrosive role race may be
playing in the polity? After, all, as the Court made clear in Miller v.
Johnson, the ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to end raceconscious decision making in political institutions.37 9 For the Court, race
consciousness is a temporary way station on the road to the Nirvana that is
colorblindness."' Difficulties arise in designing democratic institutions that
reconcile the First Amendment's liberty concerns with the Fourteenth
Amendment's equality concerns. How should we resolve this clash of
competing constitutional interests?
This Part argues that the Court can harmonize First and Fourteenth
Amendment interests if it interprets the Constitution to rule out extreme
outcomes that would violate the core concerns of both Amendments. Part
V.A uses Justice Breyer's concurrence in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC 38 and Part V.B uses the Court's decision in Easley v.
Cromartie (Cromartie 1)382 to illustrate how the Court can balance these
competing concerns.
A.

Justice Breyer's PragmaticBalancingApproach

In Shrink Missouri, the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute that
restricts campaign contributions to various statewide offices.383 The Court
reversed the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which had applied
strict scrutiny in reviewing the statute and had concluded on evidentiary
grounds that the state's interest in preventing corruption could not justify
the limits promulgated by the statute.3" 4 The Court held that limits on campaign contributions did not raise the types of First Amendment concerns
raised by limits to campaign expenditures.385 Consequently, the Court
essentially reaffirmed the approach to campaign finance reform enunciated
in Buckley.386
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case is the exchange
between Justices Breyer and Thomas on the soundness of the Court's
continued adherence to Buckley.1 7 Justice Thomas would apply strict
scrutiny to campaign contribution limitations and presumably all campaign
finance regulation that infringes upon what he views as core political
379.
515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995).
380. This is one way to read the following statement by Justice Blackmun in Bakke: "In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way." Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1977) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
381. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
382. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
383. 528 U.S. at 382-83.
384. Id. at 384; Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1998).
385. Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391-92.
386. Briffault, Beginning of the End, supra note 326, at 1729 (noting that Shrink Missouri
reaffirmed a key element of Buckley).
387. Compare Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring), with id. at 410 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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regulation that infringes upon what he views as core political speech. 388 He
reasoned that "[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment
protection ' 389 and that "a self-governing people depends upon the free
39 °
exchange of political information.
Justice Breyer purported to accept these premises but reached a different conclusion. 391' He recognized that the issue raised competing protected
interests.392 On one side of the equation:
Through contributions the contributor associates himself with the
candidate's cause, helps the candidate communicate a political
message with which the contributor agrees, and helps the candidate
win by attracting the votes of similarly minded voters.... Both
political association and political communication are at stake.393
On the other side:
[R]estrictions upon the amount any one individual can contribute to
a particular candidate seek to protect the integrity of the electoral
process-the means through which a free society democratically
translates political speech into concrete governmental action ...
Moreover, by limiting the size of the largest contributions, such
restrictions aim to democratize the influence that money itself may
bring to bear upon the electoral process. 394
Consequently, he could not support a per se presumption that campaign
finance measures are unconstitutional.395
For Justice Breyer, "simple test[s]" of constitutionality are inappropriate because campaign finance reform "significantly implicates competing
'
constitutionally protected interests in complex ways."396
Instead, the Court
should balance the competing interests: "[I]n practice that has meant
asking whether the statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of
proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not
necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less restrictive
alternative). 397 Justice Breyer acknowledged that these are difficult judgments. Consequently, he advocated deference to the decisions of the
388. See id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that "our decision in Buckley was in error, and
I would overrule it. I would subject campaign contribution limitations to strict scrutiny, under which
Missouri's contribution limits are patently unconstitutional"); see also id. at 412.
389. Id. at 410-11.
390. Id. at 411.
391. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("If the dissent believes that the Court diminishes the
importance of the First Amendment interests before us, it is wrong. The Court's opinion does not
question the constitutional importance of political speech or that its protection lies at the heart of the
First Amendment.").
392. Id.
393. Id. (citation omitted).
394. Id. at 401 (citations omitted).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 402.
397. Id.
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legislature, particularly for election regulation, which falls within a legislature's institutional knowledge.398 However, plaintiffs can overcome the
presumption of constitutionality where a regulation "work[s] disproportionate harm" upon other constitutional values. 399
Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach to campaign finance reform may
provide a means for resolving the liberty and equality tensions inherent in
the design of electoral structures. It is important to recognize, as Justice
Breyer did in the context of campaign regulation, that the design of democratic structures of representation "implicates competing constitutionally
protected interests in complex ways."4 0 The Court and commentators have
focused on the equality interests at stake, but, as this Article argues, electoral structures implicate important liberty interests as well.
It is also important to recognize that legislatures are fairly adept at
making these difficult judgments.4 ' Moreover, legislatures must have some
leeway in reasonably accommodating conflicting interests. Thus, courts
should defer to the empirical findings of legislatures unless the legislation
works a disproportionate harm upon an identifiable constitutional value.
But what does it mean to work a disproportionate harm upon an identifiable constitutional value? As I have explained elsewhere,
Constitutionalization of democratic politics-and consequently
judicial supervision of the political process-finds its strongest
justification when democratic practices do not serve any legitimate
ends and violate multiple democratic principles. Conversely,
judicial supervision of the political process is least justified (if at
all) where democratic practices serve democratic ends and judicial
review does not vindicate any democratic principles.4 '
Thus, when the design of democratic structures admittedly serves multiple
constitutional ends, though not all constitutional ends equally, judicial
supervision should take place at the margin. The racial districting cases,
and in particular Cromartie II, nicely illustrate how this balancing can
work.
B.

Application of JusticeBreyer's BalancingApproach
in Racial DistrictingCases

One can understand the racial districting cases as staking out an absolute equality position: race consciousness violates the Constitution and
must be stamped out whatever the context. Where state actors are not
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 402.
401. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1973); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our
Politics in Court, supra note 262, passim.
402. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, ConstitutionalPluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the
Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2002).
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colorblind in the design of democratic structures, the Court must step in
and enforce the equality norm. However, as. this Article has demonstrated,
this position does violence to the competing and equally important constitutional value of political association. Consequently, under Justice Breyer's
balancing approach, a strict per se presumption of unconstitutionality is not
warranted and the Court should give effect to both values.
An alternative understanding of the racial gerrymandering cases is
that "uber-race consciousness,"4" 3 or what Justice O'Connor has referred to
4 4
as "extreme instances of gerrymandering,""
wreak maximum havoc on
05
other constitutional values. Or, in Justice Breyer's terms, uber-race consciousness works disproportionate harm upon the equality principle.
Uber-race consciousness completely subordinates the equality interest to
the liberty interest.0 6 Instead, the Court must find some way to reconcile
the competing interests. Justice Breyer's opinion in CromartieII is a useful
guide to doing so.
In CromartieII, perhaps to the surprise of many,40 7 the United States
Supreme Court disagreed with the findings of a three-judge district court
that race was the predominant factor motivating the North Carolina
Legislature in its creation of the Twelfth Congressional District.4 8 The
opinion is remarkable not only for its result but also for the extensiveness
with which the Court reviewed the district court's factual findings.40 9 As
Justice Thomas correctly observed in dissent, the Court's review of the
district court's decision was much more searching than is usually warranted by the clear error standard.4 10
403. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 3, at 241.
404. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
405. This is the key point advanced by Professors Pildes and Niemi, in an early article on Shaw I;
they called this approach "value reductionism." As they explained:
When decisions reflect value reductionism, policymakers have transformed a decision
process that ought to involve multiple values-as a matter of constitutional law-and reduced
it to a one-dimensional problem. They have permitted one value to subordinate all other
relevant values. As a result, the decisionmaking process appears tainted because it has
become compromised through unconstitutional oversimplification.... Shaw [I] is best
understood, we believe, as an opinion condemning value reductionism. In the Court's view,
the process of designing election districts violates the Constitution not when race-conscious
lines are drawn, but when race consciousness dominates the process too extensively.
Pildes & Niemi, supra note 41, at 500. As this Article demonstrates, value reductionism is a two-way
street.
406. See id. at 500-01.
407. Professor Fuentes-Rohwer and I had argued in favor of the result reached by the Court and
called for the reversal of the three-judge court on the grounds later identified by the Court in Cromartie
II, but we did not expect it to happen. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 3, at 257.
408. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
409. See Melissa L. Saunders, A CautionaryTale: Hunt v. Cromartie and the Next Generation of
Shaw Litigation, I ELECTION L.J. 173, 182 (2002) ("The most striking feature of the Court's decision is
the intensity with which it reviews the district court's finding that race was the predominant factor in
the design of District 12.").
410. Cromartie 11, 532 U.S. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court does cite cases that
address the correct standard of review ... and does couch its conclusion in 'clearly erroneous'
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There are a number of plausible explanations for the Court's decision
to engage in an uncharacteristically searching review of the district court's
decision.4"' One explanation is the district court's failure to defer to the
'
state in light of the state's attempt to "balance competing interests."412
Justice Breyer's opinion emphasized two important facts. First, the underlying decision was within the scope of the legislature's role.413 Courts must
permit legislatures to exercise their judgment when legislatures are legislating within the scope of their discretion.4" 4 Second, because the state had
"articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting
decision, and the voting population is one in which race and political
affiliation are highly correlated," the Court had to be particularly cautious
in questioning the state legislature's determination.4"' The district court
ignored these concerns in its haste to vindicate the equality principle.
Justice Breyer recognized that the state's districting plan was not an
irrational act. The state was attempting to protect multiple constitutional
interests. Where the design of democratic structures reflects an effort to
give effect to multiple constitutional values, courts must defer to the judgment of state actors. This deference enables both courts and legislatures to
balance competing constitutional claims but preserves judicial review to
enforce constitutional norms. In this respect Shaw I and Cromartie H can
be viewed as bookends of the Court's racial districting doctrine. Shaw I
and perhaps Miller are best characterized as the Court's response to the
concern that bizarre electoral line drawing inflicts maximum harm on
equality principles. That is, bizarre districts may reflect excessive manipulation of racial identity by political actors or undue race essentialism.4" 6
Thus, Shaw I demonstrated the Court's determination to police those
excesses of the political process.4 17 Cromartie H acknowledged that when
state actors draw lines with race-conscious intent, they are not necessarily
doing so in a manner that inflicts maximum harm on equality principles or
overly disrupts nonracial bases for political identification. Judicial invalidation is unwarranted in these types of cases.
Incorporating Justice Breyer's pragmatic approach into the domain of
democratic politics demonstrates how the Court can give effect to the associational interest of voters of color while at the same time accounting for
other constitutional values. Just as the state may violate the Constitution's
terms.... But these incantations of the correct standard are empty gestures, contradicted by the Court's
conclusion that it must engage in 'extensive review."') (internal citations omitted).
411.
For some persuasive explanations, see Saunders, supranote 409, at 182-88.
412. Cromartie11, 532 U.S. at 242 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995)).
413. Id.
414. Id. (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 915).
415. Id.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 37-90.
417. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supranote 3, at 302.
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equality norm by the manner in which it designs electoral structures, so too
may it violate the Constitution's associational norm when its structures of
representation do not accord due respect to the associational right. When
the state designs electoral structures, state actors assign representation and
allocate political power on the basis of criteria chosen by political elites.418
While the use of race as a controversial criterion in the design of electoral
structures has long been noted,419 scholars are increasingly questioning
other criteria state actors employ in the design of electoral structures.420
Sometimes the chosen criteria map nicely onto the political identities of the
relevant electorates. Most of the time they do not, particularly when the
electorate is heterogeneous and composed of multiple and crosscutting
social identities.
As some commentators have recognized, districting exacerbates this
problem.4 2' A state cannot district in a way that provides all groups-based
on race, gender, religion, class, and so forth-a chance to associate.4 2 Districting forces a choice among these identities and leaves that choice to
self-interested political actors. Districting compels state actors to select
among competing identities and decide which identities are salient, and
thus pick out which groups are worthy of political power. Districting also
aggravates the essentialism and balkanization concerns that so animate the
Court's voting rights jurisprudence.4 23 Moreover, the process may contribute to the racialization of politics by priming racial identities and making
race the relevant criterion for political evaluation.
This need not be the state of affairs. Commentators have long recognized that alternative voting structures facilitate representation, minimize
the constitutional costs identified by the Court's racial gerrymandering
cases, and allow individuals to identify politically on the basis of characteristics they deem salient-whether the characteristics are racial, social, or
political.424 Consider once more Figure 4.425 Assume that the numerical
minority depicted in Figure 4 as Blissians of color are instead farmers with
418.

Issacharoff, supra note 42, at 903-04.

419.

See generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND

MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987); Butler, supra note 6.
420.
See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 258, at 642 ("The Shaw line of cases
imposes constitutional scrutiny on only one particular outcome in the process of insider-controlled
districting but leaves the structural problems of incumbent entrenchment and the erosion of political
competition uncorrected."); see also Sally Dworak-Fisher, Drawing the Line on Incumbency

Protection,2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 131, 169-72 (1996).
421.
422.
423.

See, e.g., GUINIER, supranote 268, at 74; Tucker, supranote 262, at 383.
GUINIER, supra note 268, at 97-101.
Consider Alan Gartner's account of his experience, as the Executive Director of New York

City's Districting Commission, in attempting to draw district lines to facilitate representation among
African American, Latino, Asian American, and gay and lesbian groups. See Gartner, supra note 274,
at 369-73.
424. See, e.g., GUINIER, supra note 268, at 137-56.
See supra p. 1245.
425.
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distinct political interests. That is, their socioeconomic characteristic
correlates with their political identity and the socioeconomic characteristic
is salient. I have argued in this Article that the plan represented in Figure 4
would violate the associational rights of Blissians of color. The conclusion
is no less true if those Blissians are instead a district group with different
political preferences. The state should not be permitted to deprive our
hypothetical farmers of any representation because the state has chosen to
use districting as its electoral structure. This observation is particularly
powerful when other alternative electoral structures are available.
How then should courts respond to this state of affairs? Should they
constitutionally mandate alternative voting structures? Not necessarily.
They can follow the Court's lead in the Shaw line of cases to take the right
of association seriously. Just as a race-conscious bizarre district indicates
that the state has impermissibly elevated the role of race in the political
process, single-member districting-and, depending upon the context, districting itself-may indicate the state's failure to sufficiently protect associational rights. That is, one can view single-member districting as
inflicting maximum harm on the associational right in the same way that
the Court views race-conscious bizarre districts vis-A-vis the equality right.
Consider also the idea that the benefits of districting are unclear. The
traditional justification, that districting facilitates representation by enabling the representative easily to meet with his or her constituents, no
longer suffices.426 Outside of the representational benefits of districting, its
primary justification is interest aggregation and the subsidiary presumption
that geography tracks interest. 427 However, in many cases, geography is not
coextensive with interest and is a poor proxy for it. In these cases, there is
no compelling reason for courts to defer to state actors where districting is
the structure at issue.
428
We could characterize this default rule as a prophylactic rule.
Where states use districting as the electoral structure of choiceparticularly where the state's electorate is not homogeneous-courts
should apply a presumption of unconstitutionality on the ground that these
districts violate the complainant's right of association. Districting itself,
just like bizarreness, would signal the constitutional violation. Notice also
426.

F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE
40 (2002) ("[T]erritorial factors (such as geographical divisions) are legitimate criteria
because districts should be compact enough to enable representatives to meet in person with their
constituents. These criteria have less weight than in the past, when travel and communication were
more difficult.").
427. Id.
428. See Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 258, at 641-48 (recommending prophylactic
approach to redress problem in incumbent-protecting gerrymanders and lack of political competition in
redistricting process); Saunders, supra note 11, at 1606 (arguing that Shaw I can be understood as a
"'prophylactic' measure that overprotects individual constitutional rights in some cases in order to
ensure adequate protection of those rights across a range of cases").
DENNIS

UNITED STATES
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that an important benefit of this rule is that it would give effect to both
equality and associational rights.
Importantly, the state need not be left without a safe harbor. States can
adopt alternative structures. These structures would at the very least
accomplish the state's goals without the attendant costs of districting.
When states adopt alternative structures of representation, courts may respond, depending upon the context, with a presumption that state actors are
pursuing multiple goals and defer to the legislature's expertise.
Thus, although electoral structures may not maximize the political
power of relevant groups and need not do so to survive scrutiny under an
associational right analysis, courts should be wary when the structures shut
an identifiable group out of the process. Courts should not defer to a state's
choice of structure if the state could have employed an alternative, less
onerous electoral structure and at the same time accomplished its legitimate
goals. Courts should prefer structures that facilitate free associational
choices instead of those, such as districting, that depend upon the state to
apportion political power among groups.4 29
CONCLUSION

This Article demonstrates the importance of considering the First
Amendment right of political association when deciding whether race is a
proper basis for political consideration. I have argued that state actors cannot be colorblind in the design of electoral structures when the state's decision to be colorblind significantly infringes upon the associational rights of
voters of color. State actors must make it possible for racial groups to
aggregate their voting power as racial groups where race and political identity are correlated.
The essential underlying inquiry is who decides whether race is a
permissible basis for political identification. The clear answer of the First
Amendment is that the individual decides. The state's purpose should not
be to try to remove race as a factor in American politics; instead, this
choice should be left to individuals.
Although the equality ideal is a worthy enterprise, we cannot pursue it
at the expense of equally worthy First Amendment interests. The Court
should strive to balance these competing interests by recognizing the First
Amendment values at stake and by providing state actors some leeway
when they are regulating pursuant to legitimate interests.

429. To be clear, I am not advocating alternative structures as the panacea to all that ails
democratic politics. The narrower point is that the First Amendment is not indifferent to the state's
choice of electoral structures if the state's choice infringes upon the individual's right to political
association and an alternative structure is available that would suit the state's goals but would not
infringe upon the individual's constitutional right.
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Further, if individuals are to make meaningful decisions, electoral
structures should promote free association. Consequently, the Supreme
Court should be suspicious of electoral structures that depend upon the
ability of state actors to recognize and give effect to politically salient characteristics.

HeinOnline -- 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1280 2003

